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In 1898, Russia, Germany and France forced the Qing government to cede them one 
territory each, which challenged the traditional predominance of the British in China. 
The British lost no time to acquire leased territories in the era of scrambling for 
concessions. Wei-Hai-Wei, an isolated leasehold in Northern China, was therefore 
occupied by the British.   
Two years after the takeover, Wei-Hai-Wei was transferred from the Admiralty and 
the War Office to the Colonial Office. However, the British invested little to construct 
this territory during its 32-year leasehold. Faced with limited funds, the 
Commissioner, James Stewart Lockhart, took several measures to develop the 
leasehold- all of which failed. The uncertain tenure of Wei Hai Wei, as many then 
policy-makers stated, played a very important part in discouraging Parliament’s 
financial support. Besides its intrinsic limits, the British policy and international 
factors also influenced the status of the colony. My research focuses on why and how 
the British changed their policy at Wei Hai Wei in its early days and what the 
Commissioner did to develop this colony. I will analyze the reason why Wei Hai Wei 
turned into an ill-fated and ignored colony of the British Empire. I argue that although 
the British kept the territory for 32 years in total (1898-1930), its development and 
future was mostly determined in its first ten years of leasehold. Researching the first 
decade of Wei Hai Wei can provide insight into British imperial policy in northern 
China in the late 19th and early the 20th century. 
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1 
Introduction 
This thesis tells the story of Wei-Hai-Wei, an ignored British leased territory, in its 
first decade leasehold. By examining Britain’s administration and policies in this 
leased territory, I attempt to examine British foreign policy in northern China in the 
late Qing dynasty. 
Great Britain occupied Wei-Hai-Wei as a leased territory from 1898 to 1930. 
Considerable documents have been made during its 32 years’ leasehold, which include 
reports on newspapers, remarks of politicians, and a series of investigation reports. 
However, these documents should be regarded as historical records, rather than 
academic research.1 Apart from the limited research results, studies on British rule in 
Wei-Hai-Wei remained unexploited until the period from 1998 to 2002, when the 
Weihai Archive copied the records of Wei-Hai-Wei’s leasehold from overseas sources 
and brought them back to China. By then, the history of the leasehold of Wei-Hai-Wei 
attracted the attention of the Chinese people, especially those in Shandong Province. 
Currently, from most of the research results presented as dissertations, very few 
monographs have come out. The major publications on Wei-Hai-Wei are the follow: 
Pamela Atwell’s British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers: the British 
Administration of Wei-Hai-Wei (1898-1930) and the Territory's Return to Chinese 
Rule firstly used substantial archive materials at the British National Archives, 
delineating the general situation during the 32 years of the  British occupation of 
Wei-Hai-Wei.2 Atwell made the comparison between the way the British governed 
Wei-Hai-Wei and the Chinese governed after it retrieval. Unlike Britain’s mild 
administrative methods, Atwell points out that the Chinese reformers were more 
radical and earned little success in developing Wei-Hai-Wei. 
E-Tu Zen Sun's article, "The Lease of Wei-hai Wei," explores the responses of the 
Chinese officials to the British request of leasing Wei-Hai-Wei.3 She argues that 
                                                          
1 During the leasing period, the colonial government had annual reports every year, most of which 
were published in the next year. The contents of the reports were related to finance, public utilities, 
police, judiciary, education, economy, sanitation and special events, etc. of Wei-Hai-Wei for the 
whole year. They are very important historical materials. 
2 Pamela Atwell, British mandarins and Chinese reformers: The British administration of Weihaiwei 
(1898-1930) and the territory's return to Chinese rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985. 
3 E-tu Zen Sun, ''The Lease of Wei-hai Wei '', Pacific Historical Review, Vol.19, 1950, 277-283.  
2 
Wei-Hai-Wei was an attempt to win British support and bring Britain closer to the 
Qing government by those pro-British ministers in the Beijing court. 
In their "The British at Wei-Hai-Wei: a case study in the irrationality of Empire, " 
Clarence B. Davis and Robert J. Gowen claim that the British decision-makers 
occupied Wei-Hai-Wei irrationally, and their refusal to return it 30 years later was also 
an unreasonable decision.4 These are examples to demonstrate that the Empire’s 
irrationality was very prevalent within the British government in the late 19th century 
and early 20th century. Thomas Otte refutes such opinion in his  "WEE-AH-WEE? : 
Britain at WeiHaiwei, 1898-1930" by analyzing the lengthy debates concerning the 
leasing and military significance of Wei-Hai-Wei in the Whitehall.5 Otte argues that 
the lack of proper policy-coordinating mechanism led to the ignorance of the leased 
territory at the end, thus indicating the strategic and systemic limitations of the British 
power in the Far East. 
Ian Nish also discusses this topic in "The Royal Navy and the Taking of Weihaiwei, 
1898-1905, " and provides further discussion on the role of Royal Navy had played in 
the course of leasing Wei-Hai-Wei.6 He concludes that the acquisition of the leased 
territory was not for naval value, as little consultation had taken place before the 
Foreign Office made the request to China. 
In the article "Zhongying shoujiao weihaiwei zujiedi de jiaoshe (1921-1930)" 
[Interactions between China and Britain about the restoration of the leased territory 
Wei-Hai-Wei (1921-1930)], Li Enhan generally describes the rendition process 
between China and Britain, and argues that it was a political decision between China 
and Britain and the rendition concerned closely the relationship between the two 
countries.7 
                                                          
4 Davis, Clarence B., and Robert J. Gowen. "The British at Weihaiwei: A Case Study in the Irrationality 
of Empire." Historian 63.1 (2000): 87-104.  
5 Thomas Otte, WEE-AH-WEE?: Britain at WeiHaiwei, 1898-1930. in British Naval Strategy East of 
Suez, 1900-2000: Influences and Actions. ed. by Kennedy Greg, (London and New York: Frank Cass, 
2005), 4-33. 
6 Ian Nish, The Royal Navy and The Taking of Weihaiwei, 1898-1905, 2001. 
7 Li Enhan, Zhongying shoujiao weihaiwei zujiedi de jiaoshe (The Negotiation on Restoration of 
Wei-Hai-Wei between China and Great Britain),1921-1930. Academic Sinica Collections, Vol. 21 1992.  
3 
In British Rule in China: Law and Justice in Wei-Hai-Wei 1898-1930, Tan Carol G. S 
first sketches the history of Wei-Hai-Wei's legal system and describes 
comprehensively the laws, courts and locals' attitude in the leased territory.8  
Two most important commissioners during the British occupation in Wei-Hai-Wei 
-James Lockhart and Reginald Johnston, also attracted some studies, among those the 
most significant works are two biographies written by Shiona Airlie. In Thistle and 
Bamboo: The Life and Times of Sir James Stewart Lockhart and Scottish Mandarin: 
The Life and Times of Sir Reginald Johnston,9 Airlie relates the days, as part of their 
lives, when Lockhart and Johnston worked at Wei-Hai-Wei respectively.  
Current studies on Wei-Hai-Wei as a leased territory mostly focus on the delineation 
of history of Britain's leasing and governing of Wei-Hai-Wei. The primary dilemma 
researchers encounter is the lack of cross-reference between the Chinese and English 
materials, largely because very few Chinese records on Wei-Hai-Wei’s leased history 
are left except for sporadic reports in newspapers and official memorials. The major 
Chinese archive on Wei-Hai-Wei concerns documents on the rendition in the 
1920s-1930s.10  
Nevertheless, when the British government withdrew from Wei-Hai-Wei in 1930, all 
the files relating to the colonial administrations were shipped back to London and now 
are preserved in the British National Archive. Besides that, thousands of personal 
collections (including letters, newspapers, paintings and photos, etc.) of 
Wei-Hai-Wei's longest-serving commissioner Stewart Lockhart are deposited well in 
                                                          
8 Tan Carol GS, British rule in China: law and justice in Weihaiwei 1898-1930. Wildy, Simmonds & Hill, 
2008. 
9 Shiona Airlie, Thistle and Bamboo: The Life and Times of Sir James Stewart Lockhart. Vol. 1. Hong 
Kong University Press, 2010. Scottish Mandarin: The Life and Times of Sir Reginald Johnston. Vol. 1. 
Hong Kong University Press, 2012. 
10 The major archives of Wei-Hai-Wei’s leased history in Weihai Archive were copied from the British 
National Archive, Scotland National Library and other oversea Archives. None local records were left 
in Weihai Archive. By visiting Beijing China National Archive, Shandong Provincial Archive, Shanghai 
Archive and Hong Kong Public Record Office, very limited documents on Wei-Hai-Wei or James 
Lockhart were found. Only two short imperial edicts in respect to sanctify the lease treaty of 
Wei-Hai-Wei was kept in China National Archive. The only records can be found in Shanghai Archive 
related to Wei-Hai-Wei concerns the discussion of its rendition since 1920s. The materials refer to 
Wei-Hai-Wei in Hong Kong Public Record Office are a few records of James Lockhart who had been 
Hong Kong’s general officials before he went to Wei-Hai-Wei. It may be shocked to know that nothing 
of leased history of Wei-Hai-Wei exists in Shandong Provincial Archive. But archives on Wei-Hai-Wei’s 
rendition in 1920s-1930s are preserved well in Nanjing, Shanghai Archive and Modern History 
Database (Taiwan). 
4 
Scotland National Library and George Watson's College. The large storage of 
documents about Wei-Hai-Wei will definitely facilitate those who intend to do 
research on the leased territory. 
Given that Wei-Hai-Wei itself was an important participant in a series of international 
occurrences during its 32 years of leasehold, current research, obviously, cannot meet 
the role Wei-Hai-Wei had played both in modern China and world history. Although 
some aspects of Wei-Hai-Wei have been investigated by scholars, little has been 
discussed on the policy-making and decision-changing of the British government 
when leasing and setting up the administration in the leased territory. Even though the 
British kept the territory for 32 years in total, its development and future were mostly 
determined in the first ten years of its leasehold.  
My research focuses on why and how the London policy-makers changed their 
decisions regarding Wei-Hai-Wei in the early years of the occupation. I attempt to 
answer the following questions in this thesis: what happened in Wei-Hai-Wei from 
1898 to 1906? Why were the colonists unwilling to construct a strategic territory? 
What kind of measures did the colonial government take to develop this colony before 
it was actually abandoned after 1906? The abundant records of the British Foreign 
Office, the Colonial Office and numerous government reports allow me to explore 
those questions. The Chinese files available in the National Archives, the officials’ 
writings like the report of Xu Zushan and the online database such as Shenbao, albeit 
comparatively limited, provide me a wide picture of Wei-Hai-Wei. 
The thesis is organized along a timeline. Chapter 1 lays out the historical background 
of the British policy transfer in China. Chapter 2 explores the decision-making process 
to lease Wei-Hai-Wei. Chapter 3 studies the administration set up in Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Chapter 4 discusses Wei-Hai-Wei’s development under James Lockhart. Chapter 5 
analyzes why Wei-Hai-Wei did not turn into a prospective leased territory. 
With military significance, Wei-Hai-Wei, as one of the headquarters for the Qing 
navy, did not turn into a naval base in the hands of Britain. Nor did it become a 
prosperous trade center for the British despite it being the only duty-free port in 
Shandong peninsula. Researching the first decade of Wei-Hai-Wei’s leasehold is 
expected to shed light on the British imperial policy in northern China in the late 19th 
5 
and early 20th century, and help us to learn about the nature of leased territories in 
China.  
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Chapter 1. Sino-Japanese War and the change of the British policy in China 
Wei-Hai-Wei, as the headquarter of Beiyang Fleet, was a major battle field in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. In this chapter, I will briefly summarize the historical 
background of the war and the demanding terms of Treaty of Shimonoseki in which 
explains why Wei-Hai-Wei was occupied by Japanese after the war. In the second 
part, it is necessary to sketch out how Japanese ambition in Liaodong peninsular 
induced the Triple intervention and why the subsequent "awards" required by the triple 
countries triggered the scramble for concessions in China, which largely disrupted the 
original power balance and destroyed British interest in this country. The final part of 
this chapter will explore the transfer of British policy in China in “game” of cutting up 
the old country, thus to investigate why British policy turned to take two lease 
territories in China. 
1.1 The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95: 
The Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 completely changed the political situation of East 
Asia. Prior to the war, China was still regarded as a powerful country as a result of 
Self-Strengthening Movement which started in 1861, featuring military modernization 
and industrialization. A British newspaper assumed that China's navy ranked eighth all 
over the world and number one in Asia in 189111, indicating that China had already 
been one of the world's leading naval powers. Yet Immamuel Hsu evaluates the 
Self-strengthening Movement, "barely scratched the surface of modernization, 
without achieving a breakthrough in industrialization."12 Almost coincidently, Japan 
took its step into a modernized reform in 1868, better-known as Meiji Restoration 
which involved a nearly completely revolution, including education, military, western 
ideology and so on. The outbreak of the war was, in effect, "a significant contest 
between the two after a generation of modernization."13 
The demanding terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki embraces a huge indemnity, 
territorial cessions, the opening of new ports and other additional clauses in the favor 
of Japan. It is the Article VIII of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, allowed Japanese troops 
to be stationed in Wei-Hai-Wei until the required indemnities were paid off. It was 
                                                          
11 Young John Allen, The Globe Magazine. Vol 88. 1896, 16051. Japan's navy ranked 16th in the same 
page. 
12 Hsu, Immanuel Chung-yueh. "The Rise of modern China." (1975). 287  
13 Hsu. The rise of Modern China. 340. 
7 
stipulated: "As a guarantee of the faithful performance of the stipulations of this Act, 
China consents to the temporary occupation by the military forces of Japan of 
Weihaiwei, in the province of Shantung."14 
The disastrous defeat in the Sino-Japanese war exposed China’s decadence totally and 
triggered a competitive scramble for concessions among western powers, as John 
Fairbank points out, "China came to be abjectly victimized only after 1894."15  
1.2 Triple intervention and scramble for concessions: 
When Japan strode onto the world stage as a victor in 1894-95 war, the Far East 
became a hot spot of the globe. Observed by William Langer, the Sino-Japanese War 
"marked the transition of the Far Eastern question from a state of quiescence to one of 
extreme activity. From 1895 until 1905 the problems connected with China and her 
future demanded the untiring vigilance of the European powers. More and more they 
came to dominate the course of the international relations."16 Although technically 
China's "quiescence" had been broken since the First Opium War and being 
continually disturbed by sporadic invasions from western powers, the fiasco in 1894 
merely catalyzed the process in a more humiliating way. 
The first occurrence is the "Triple intervention". Threatened by Japan's ambition in 
northeastern China, where Russia took as its own sphere of influence, Russia 
immediately initiated the intervention with France and German to "friendly suggest" 
(with threat of naval force) Japan to give up the Liaodong Peninsula in exchange for a 
large compensation from the Qing government. Considering the weakened post-war 
strength and fear of a complete annulment of the impending endorsement of the treaty, 
                                                          
14 MacMurray John V. A. ed., Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894-1919, Vol. 1: 
Manchu Period (1894-1911), P.21. The whole details including in the Article VIII including the 
followings: 
“Upon payment of the first two instalments of the war indemnity herein stipulated for and the 
exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and navigation, the said place shall be 
evacuated by the Japanese forces, provided the Chinese Government consents to pledge, under 
suitable and sufficient arrangements, the Customs revenue of China as security for the payment of 
the principal and interest of the remaining instalments of the said indemnity. In the event that no 
such arrangements are concluded, such evacuation shall only take place upon the payment of the 
final instalment of said indemnity. It is, however, expressly understood that no such evacuation shall 
take place until after the exchange of the ratifications of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.” 
15 Fairbank, John King, and Ta-tuan Chʻen. The Chinese world order: traditional China's foreign 
relations. Vol. 32. Harvard University Press, 1968. 259 
16 William Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, New York, 1965, 167. 
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Japan unwillingly announced its permanent giving up of the Liaodong Peninsula after 
failing to ally other powers to counterpoise the Dreibund.  
Urs Matthias Zachmann's concludes that the triple intervention proved China in a 
winning position,17 however, the subsequences proved it just kicked off a game of 
cutting up China.18 Dreibund's interference precluded the fact that the colonizing 
powers' "relations with China, which until 1894 had been primarily commercial, now 
became predominantly political."19 Shortly after the intervention, the triple lost no 
time in requiring "rewards" from the court of Beijing. The instant "reward" was that, in 
order to pay the indemnity to Japan, Qing accepted the first indemnity loan from a 
Russo-French combination at the expense of paying interests by revenues of the 
Maritime Customs and allowing the two creditor nations to get involved in the China 
Maritime Customs, which was monopolized by Britain with its agent Robert Hart. 
Despite the real object of the loan program for Russia and France was to "bring China 
under their political and financial domination", they successfully earned appreciations 
from Chinese government and extended their influence at Beijing.20  
Taking advantage of the political benefits acquired from the intervention and the loan, 
the French soon presented their claims upon China in two Franco-Chinese conventions 
of June 20, 1895.21 The first one forced China to admit Sino-Annamese frontier in 
France's favor, while the second one ceded France extensive privileges of mining and 
railways in the southern Chinese provinces of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong. It 
was the two concessions that invented a new form of foreign activity in China which 
endangered the existing power balance, especially against British 
commercial-oriented interests in the East.22 The exclusive predominance policy was 
quickly emulated by Russia, German, Japan and also Britain, who competed in 
scrambling for a great number of concessions, ranging from railway constructions to 
the second and third indemnity loans, also from the Chinese post system to territory 
cessions. In particular, the occupation of territory became a main concern among the 
powers, because it could both not only provide legitimate footholds for economic 
                                                          
17 Urs Matthias Zachmann, China and Japan in the late Meiji Period, 39. 
18 Daiyi et al., Jia Wu Zhan Zheng Yu Dong Ya Zheng Zhi, 263. 
19 Philip Joseph, Foreign diplomacy in China, 1894-1900: a study in political and economic relations 
with China (New York: Octagon Books, 1971),62. 
20 Joseph, Foreign diplomacy in China. 135 
21 Young, British Policy in China. 1895-1902. 29 
22 Young. British policy in China. 29 
9 
expansion but also meet the demand of national expansion. Contest for territories 
became fiercely based on the fact that the preferable territories which should be 
coaling ports actually were limited especially when it comes to satisfying the basic 
navy and commercial requirements.23  
Although "the date at which the Russia policy of encroachment was put into operation 
in China preceded the Kiaochau episode by approximately two years",24 Germany was 
the bellwether in threatening the integrity of China. Germany sensed that they were 
suffering a loss of prestige when the Chinese government refused twice upon their 
request for acquiring Jiaozhou Bay 胶州湾 in December 1896 and January of 1897, 
particularly Germany was already a late player in China compared to other powers. 
Consequently, the German Emperor, Kaiser Wilhelm II, was convinced by his adviser, 
M. Kreyer, that "Force was the only language which they (Chinese) understood".25  
With acquiescence from Russia and Britain, Germany soon found a chance to obtain 
Jiaozhou Bay when two German missionaries were killed in Shandong Province in 
November of 1897. Germany gave no time to the Beijing court to accept its 
requirements by intimidating the recently defeated country with its naval power. The 
German-Chinese Jiaozhou Convention was formally signed on 6 March 1898 in 
Beijing. The main terms concern the cession of Jiaozhou territories, and railway and 
mining rights, along with other commercial priorities in Shandong Province. 
Accordingly, Jiaozhou was put under a lease to Germany of 99 years and Shandong 
became Germany's sphere of influence. By the occupation of Jiaozhou, Germany 
started an era of the cutting up of Chinese territories. 
Court Muravieff, Russian Foreign Minister, expressed Russian's eagerness after 
Germany's action by stating "this offered a favorable occasion for us to seize one of the 
Chinese ports, notably Port Arthur or the adjacent Dalianwan."26 It turned out that 
Russia acquired the both under a lease of 25 years within three months by coercing 
Beijing court, as well as a very large sphere of influence covering almost the whole 
Liaodong peninsula. In fact, Russia never regarded the above region as "leased 
territory" which should be handed back to China when the tenure expired. In 1899, just 
                                                          
23 Young ,British policy in China, 43 
24 Joseph, Foreign diplomacy in China, 191 
25 Ibid., 40. 
26 Joseph, Foreign policy in China, 204. 
10 
one year later, Russia renamed the whole areas "Eastern province", taking Liaodong 
peninsula as a province of its own.27 France never let herself leave behind in this 
rivalry. On the 9 and 10 April of 1898, one month after German's occupation of 
Jiaozhou, by an exchange of notes with China, France acquired two significant 
concessions: leasing Guangzhou-wan for ninety-nine years as a naval station and 
coaling deport; assurances of Yunnan, Guangxi and Guangdong as French influence 
regions. Thus, France got its long desired domains in Southern China.  
The irony is that the pioneers in partitioning of China were Dreibund, who had forced 
Japan to render Liaodong Peninsula in order to "maintain the integrity of China" no 
more than three years ago.  
1.3 British policy in China and the taking of Wei-Hai-Wei and the New 
Territories 
It seems that the British Empire, the traditional power and the early comer in China, 
could not help but witness other powers obtained more and more concessions in this 
old country. What kind of policy did Great Britain adopt during the era of 
competition? Hereby, additional information in terms of British policy in China is 
necessary.  
When the Sino-Japanese War broke out, Qing government appealed assist from 
Britain and other powers to eschew further conflicts. Given predominant in 
commercial interests of China (by 1890s more than 65 percent of China's whole trade 
was carried by Britain)28, the British proposed a truce which required the Qing to pay 
an indemnity to Japan for the cost of the war. But it failed. Compared to the 
Sino-Japanese War, the British concerned more about Russia's expansion in China, 
which would damage Britain's influence. In that case, Britain was disposed to a 
stronger Japan in northeast Asia to counterpoise Russia. The policy of the British then 
turned in favor towards Japan under the grounds of the safeguarding of its trade.29 
Thus, Britain did not take up in the intervention against Japan to return Liaodong 
Peninsula since Japan's peace terms did not impair the trading opportunities of 
                                                          
27 Daiyi et al., 275. 
28 Joseph, Foreign Policy in China.73. 
29 Daiyi et al., 108. 
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Britain,30 besides that the Liaodong peninsula was not in British concerned sphere of 
influence.31 
When the era of the cutting up of China was coming, here I quote Joseph's words 
"Russia, however, planned the gradual disintegration of the Chinese Empire whereas 
Britain strove to maintain its integrity." 32  Gazing the Dreibund obtaining vast 
concessions in China, British statesmen felt that their trade and privileges in China 
became seriously menaced. Thus, it was impossible for the British to keep their 
original policy of maintaining Chinese integrity and merely focusing on commerce. 
On the one hand, the British government had to safeguard its trade against the Russian 
assault from north, and also against the French assault from the south,33 while the two 
had already established their own spheres of influence. On the other hand, the British 
had to take measures to maintain their position in China as well as in the whole world 
because Britain seemed to be losing her dominance from 1894.34 Consequently, the 
British adjusted their policy in China and joined the competition in disintegrating 
China. Wei-Hai-Wei was thus requested in March 1898, the New Territories as an 
extension of Hong Kong was acquired later in the same year.  
The terms of the conventions leasing the two places were almost identical, yet there 
were some intrinsic differences between them. Although one may support Clarence 
Davis and Robert Gowen's argument of the irrationality of empire in leasing 
Wei-Hai-Wei, which British policymakers acquired with no clear reason, 35  the 
prevailing opinion is that occupying Wei-Hai-Wei was probably the only choice for 
Britain to maintain her international reputation and military presence in China, 
especially in north China.36 Whereas the expansion of territory in Hong Kong played a 
crucial role in defending British colony of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island, though the 
acquirement was also regarded against the French attainment in Guangzhou Bay and 
southern China. Moreover, unlike the lease of New Territories with 99 years, the 
leasehold of Wei-Hai-Wei was stipulated "so long as Port Arthur shall remain in the 
                                                          
30 Joseph, Foreign Policy in China. 118. 
31 Young, British Policy in China. 18. 
32 Joseph, Foreign diplomacy in China, 217. 
33 Joseph, Foreign Diplomacy in China, 229. 
34Hosea B. Morse, Chinese Empire Diplomatic Relations. 132. 
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occupation of Russia."37 In addition, the New Territories were taken over as "part and 
parcel of Her Majesty's colony in Hong Kong" and its inhabitants were naturalized as 
British subjects, while Wei-Hai-Wei never got such official "colony" designation from 
the British government and the inhabitants still retained their nationality of Chinese.38 
The uncertain tenure and position to a large extent affected the development of 
Wei-Hai-Wei, which will be discussed later.  
Taking Wei-Hai-Wei and the New Territories, though signified the partition of China 
which was against Britain's original policy, was then "the only policy open to her"39 in 
order to guarantee her commercial interests and political privileges as well as maintain 
the balance of power in the Far East.  
It was China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 revealed its completely 
corruption and weakness. With the occupation of Liaodong peninsular, Japan became 
a powerful competitor in East Asia, particularly in northeast China, where Russia 
regarded as its own influence of sphere. The triple intervention hardly was a victory of 
Beijing Court but a strategy adopted by Russia and its alliance to prevent Japan’s 
ambition in Liaodong peninsular. Besides that, the triple powers flaunt themselves as 
benefactor of Qing government, required a series of concessions in the following 
years. The "game of cutting up China" led by the Dreibund threatened British 
traditional privilege and commercial interest in the country. Instead of maintaining its 
original policy, British joined the competition of disintegrating China by leasing 
Wei-Hai-Wei and New Territories. To a large extent, the transfer of British policy was 
a literally passive response to the shift of international situation in China. 
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Chapter 2. The Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, 1898 
Ye Jingoes shout your very best, 
Ye grumblers cease to cry; 
The East is conquered by the West, 
We’ve taken Wei-Hai-Wei. 
  We none of us know where it is,  
But that’s no reason why 
We should not fell heroic zeal 
At taking Wei-Hai-Wei. 
George Curzon once has seen the spot, 
And George is pretty spry, 
And George declared that it must be got- 
We must have Wei-Hai-Wei. 
German and Russian fleets, Ah ha! 
Who cares for you, small fry? 
We laugh at all your warlike feats, 
We’re safe in Wei-Hai-Wei. 
                                    -Sir Wilfrid Lawson, Easter 189840 
Being a mostly anti-imperial Liberal politician and a humorist, Wilfrid Lawson is 
probably mocking those imperialists who were shouting jingoism and feeling heroic 
upon the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei, despite they not knowing where it was. The fact that 
this is but a short doggerel with respect to Britain’s taking of Wei-Hai-Wei, a lot of 
implications nevertheless are contained. As it goes ''We [Britain] none of us know 
where it is'', Wei-Hai-Wei, a distant and impoverished settlement in Shandong 
peninsula, seemed to have been unexpectedly occupied by the British in the year of 
1898. Meanwhile, it indicates a pride by taking Wei-Hai-Wei since ''Jingoes shout your 
best'', ''grumblers cease to cry'' and ''that’s no reason why we should not feel heroic 
zeal''. More important, Britain’s action sounds like they have some relation with 
''German and Russia'' because the author hinted that with the acquisition of 
Wei-Hai-Wei, ''who cares for'' fleets of the continentals’.   
Prior to digging into details, those who were involved in and prompted the lease of 
Wei-Hai-Wei will be introduced as follows, since their political tendencies and 
standpoints are crucial in understanding why and how the decision-making process 
took place in the time of the ''scramble for concessions''. To examine the way of 
communicating the Wei-Hai-Wei issue among those policy-makers in London and 
order-followers in Beijing, St. Petersburg, Berlin and Tokyo, it will shed light on how 
the frontline ministers and the London supervisors cooperated on the objective of 
                                                          
40 Wilfrid Lawson and F.C. Gould, Cartoons in Rhyme and Line (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1905),62. 
14 
leasing Wei-Hai-Wei. Therefore, a more complex picture of the root and course during 
the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei will be presented. 
Robert Salisbury, was both the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs from 1895. He was never a ‘splendid isolationist’ but ''a patient, pragmatic 
practitioner, with a keen understanding of Britain’s historic interests.''41 L.K. Young 
evaluates highly his willingness to come to terms with foreign adversaries in those 
areas where their interests clashed to maintain Great Britain’s existing and clearly 
established interests in the area intact.42 Arthur Balfour was in charge of the Foreign 
Office during the illness of Robert Salisbury in 1898 as well later in his absence 
abroad. Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under-Secretary, and Francis Bertie, senior 
clerk and assistant under-secretary, both exercised considerable influence over the 
formulation of Britain’s China policy. Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Office 
Secretary, also began to interest himself in Chinese affairs since the Port Arthur crisis 
of 1898.43 Claude MacDonald, Britain’s minister at Beijing from 1896 to 1900, and his 
predecessor, Nicholas O’Conor, who was appointed as Ambassador to Russia, have 
both displayed their competence regarding the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei. The specific 
roles and intension of these figures in the whole course of taking over Wei-Hai-Wei 
will be observed in the following paragraphs. 
2.1 British initial request of Wei-Hai-Wei and German’s occupation of Jiaozhou 
Whether Britain’s demand of Wei-Hai-Wei was directly triggered by German’s action 
in Jiaozhou in the winter of 1897 remains questionable, however, the major concern of 
British at that time seems to be the possibilities of her original own interests affected or 
not by China-German treaty. 
Although the practical demands of acquiring Wei-Hai-Wei was requested in March 
1898, documents explained some overtures from both sides of Great Britain and 
China. George Curzon, then serving as under-secretary for foreign affairs, advised that 
Britain should remain ready to occupy a piece of Chinese territory in the area if 
necessary as early as December 1897.44 It was not until three months later when 
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Russian intentions in Manchuria became evident, however, the proposal was taken 
seriously and Curzon was required to submit a more detailed statement regarding 
Wei-Hai-Wei.45  
It was in a telegraph from MacDonald to Salisbury when the Chinese standpoint upon 
Britain’s lease of Wei-Hai-Wei was first mentioned. MacDonald reported the advice 
of Sir Robert Hart, the Inspector General of the Maritime Customs Service, that ''the 
Chinese Government would offer lease of Wei-hai Wei to British Government if she 
thought response would be favourable'' on February 25, 1898.46  
However, no clear clues have explained what China’s expected response was in 
Claude MacDonald’s abovementioned telegraph. What was already known is that this 
was a time when China had just been extorted to concede Jiaozhou to Germany, and 
was anxious about the occupation of Port Arthur by Russia, and also a critical moment 
when Russia was competing against the British for the third indemnity loan of the 
Qing court.47 In order to enhance its competitiveness against Russia in the loan, Ewen 
Cameron, manager of the Hong Kong and Shanghai bank in London, suggested that 
the British Government should guarantee the loan, and if Russia made the loan she 
would doubtless insist on terms which would seriously damage British influence and 
prestige as well as cripple British trade.48 The suspension in the loan negotiations 
together with the potential dangers of German and Russian occupation of Jiaozhou and 
Port Arthur, motivated Robert Salisbury to rethink the policy in China.49 He agreed a 
positive action was necessary, otherwise the Chinese fiscal administration would 
probably ''fall into unfriendly hands to the serious detriment of our trade''.50 Besides 
transferring Cameron’s appeal for government help to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Salisbury made an attempt to evaluate the significance of occupation of the 
northern ports. He started toward the idea of establishing ''a winter station for our fleet 
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near Chefoo or the constant presence of our vessels there'' in December 1897.51 Before 
long, Salisbury ordered MacDonald to demand ''some corresponding concession in the 
event of Germany obtaining a permanent base in northern China'' on the New Year’s 
Eve.52 During the first days of January 1898, it became necessary for the Premier to 
obtain competent advice from naval and military authorities upon potential harbors in 
China. 
Thomas Otte asserts that the original idea of acquiring a port in northern China was 
rooted in the German seizure of Jiaozhou in mid-November 1897, and not in Russia’s 
lease of Port Arthur in March 1898. It was true that ''no reference was made to any 
possible Russian territorial acquisition'', nor did Russia officially raise the claim to 
take over Port Arthur and Dalianwan until March 1898.Yet a Russian naval squadron 
was concentrated at Port Arthur as early as mid-December 1897, nominally defending 
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity from German’s threat in Jiaozhou. At that 
time, the Qing government credulouosly counted on Russia’s promise, and even 
ordered the army in Port Arthur to offer material assistance to Russian ships. 53 
However, Russia’s pro-Qing statement did not bewilder the British who immediately 
realized that the appearance of Russian naval ships was a clear indication of St 
Petersburg’s intention to follow the German move.54  
Considering Robert Salisbury’s suggestions of ''winter station'' near Chefoo and 
''corresponding concession'', especially the proposal of requiring an ''adequate 
counterpoise to German and Russian'' of December 23, 1897 by Nicholas O’Conor, 
Otte concludes the decision to acquire a port in northern China was taken as a 
necessary countermove to German occupation of Jiaozhou, rather than deterring 
Russian action in Port Arthur, as the Convention for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei 
stipulated and other scholars assessed.55 
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The fact, however, is the British did not put forward acquisition of a northern port until 
Russia intended to occupy Port Arthur as a closed and fortified port which would 
openly challenge the open door policy, and which would thus obviously endanger the 
commercial interests of the British Empire.56 Nor did the British ignore German’s 
occupation of Jiaozhou when one considers the lengthy Cabinet debates and 
correspondences on the matter. 
As a matter of fact, from the outset, Germany positively sought the support of Great 
Britain regarding her action in Jiaozhou by deliberately hinting that Qing government 
was eager to provide Germany a port in South of China, and Russia coincidently made 
similar suggestions to them.57 German claimed themselves had rejected such advices 
because of Britain, with whose major interests in the south, Germany did not wish to 
come into conflict.58 Those indications were reminiscent of an old discussion of the 
previous winter, relating to the possible need to claim such a port as Zhoushan for a 
British counterpoise to when Germany would likely claim a coaling port either at 
Fuzhou, Shantou or Xiamen. Leonard Young points out that Salisbury’s distaste for 
such a policy of counterpoise, although he recognized that if necessary it would have 
to be followed.59  
Furthermore, A German newspaper claimed German action ''to fulfill its legitimate 
desire to possess, like other nations, a point of support for its trade and navigation in 
Chinese waters.'' 60  When convincing British understanding of his intention, the 
German Prime Minister informed Salisbury, there was no better model for them to 
follow except those of British colonies which developed into prosperousness under the 
policy of an open port.61 Despite the fact that  ''In England the flag followed the trade, 
but in Germany some action of the Government would seem to be required to induce 
the trade to extend its operations'', it should be regarded as methods of protecting 
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German’s commercial interests,62 and a course taken most acceptable to Great Britain 
whose direct sphere of interest was far away.63 
Salisbury told the German ambassador ''the mode in which the purpose of Germany 
had been attained impressed'' him more unfavorably than the purpose itself.64 He 
admitted that with the German action it was ''probable no great injury had been 
inflicted upon England'', though the relation to Britain’s Treaty rights in China would 
require careful considerations.65 
In contrast to Bertie’s judgment that the German action at Jiaozhou had come only 
after prior consultation with Russia,66 based on the dissatisfaction manifested by the 
Russia Legation upon the German seizure of Jiaozhou, which Russia would have liked 
to recognize as her own preserves, MacDonald reported the outcome would cause 
discontent to Russia and that ''there can be little question that a Shantung port in 
German hands is far less of a menace to the independence of China than if it were held 
by Russia.''67 Such analysis was in accordance with what was said before by Salisbury 
that the German stay in Jiaozhou ''would act as an irritant to Russia but would not hurt 
us, but that if they go to Foochow we ought to obtain compensation at Chusan.''68 In 
such case, Salisbury was not inclined to protest against the German occupation of 
Jiaozhou.69  
What really concerned the British regarding Germany’s occupation in Shandong, at 
this stage, was whether ''exclusive commercial privileges'' demanded by Germany 
would affect the commercial interests of Great Britain. MacDonald defined the British 
position as not in agreement with Germany’s exclusive privileges of railway and 
mining constructions in Shandong province, when he first was informed of Germany’s 
probable requirements, 70  because ''it affords a dangerous precedent, for if China 
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concedes such preferential rights to Germany in one province there is no reason why 
she should not concede similar exclusive privileges to France or Russia in all the 
remaining provinces of the Empire.''71 
Under the instruction of Salisbury, MacDonald immediately addressed the Yamen that 
the British government would claim equal privileges for British subjects, and would 
demand compensation if existing rights had been infringed on December 10, 1897.72 
Frank C. Lascelles, ambassador to Germany, reported his communication on the event 
of German action in Shandong with German Foreign Minister M. de Bulow on January 
3, 1898. Lascelles was told that German Government had no intentions to create 
complications, to disturb the peace, or to shake the Chinese Empire, and still less to do 
anything which might be disagreeable to England. ''Indeed, one reason for selecting 
the port of Jiaozhou, was that it was in the north of China, and thus far removed from 
the regions in which England was directly interested.'' 73  Meanwhile, Lascelles 
expressed Britain’s reaction that no objections to the German’s action in China was 
raised, however if exclusive privileges should be put forward, or other countries 
should seek to take possession of Chinese ports, ''it would probably become necessary 
for Her Majesty’s Government to take steps for the protection of her vast interests in 
China.''74 Germany repeatedly made announcements of their goodwill towards Great 
Britain, and their open port policy in Jiaozhou convinced the British government not to 
interfere in their action. 
There were no practical proposals to acquire a northern port to counterpoise Germany, 
as Thomas Otte concludes. Moreover, as a result of the attitude towards an open 
harbor, several of the leading newspapers in England had taken a favorable view of the 
German action in China, and had written in a friendly spirit of the occupation of 
Jiaozhou.75 Rather than territorial requirements, the British government at this stage 
were preoccupied by the third indemnity loan, and whether its commercial interests in 
China could be influenced or not.  
2.2 Britain’s initial reaction to Russian intention in Liaodong Peninsular 
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Britain at one time even had little intention to object to Russia securing a warm-water 
port in the Far East. Arthur Bigge, secretary to the Queen, reported the instructions of 
Queen Victoria to help Russia to get a port in the North of China.76 Salisbury also 
stated that on the face of it Britain would ''have no prejudice against a Russian lease of 
Port Arthur and Dalianwan for twenty years for purely commercial purposes'', but he 
added that ''unless Russia offers something in return we cannot formally assent to it.''77 
The sole concern of Salisbury was that any ports taken by other powers should remain 
open to British trade and what effect on the trade and commerce of China the opening 
of these places by Europeans would have. Similarly, the contemporary competition on 
the indemnity loan was to prevent a containment of British influence and to protect 
existing British rights in case the loan was acquired by another power.78 After all, 
British policy in China was to open up the country to foreign trade as much as 
possible.79  
In order to secure British interests, Salisbury had to adjust his instructions to his 
subordinates in Beijing and St. Petersburg from time to time. Some telegraphs spoke 
of the Prime Minister’s anxiety and dilemma with respect to Russia’s policy in 
Dalianwan. On 17 January 1898, Salisbury instructed MacDonald to not be bound to 
insist on making Dalianwan a Treaty port if impracticable, but ordered the latter to 
make the demand of the Zongli Yamen to ''obtain a promise of such a concession if 
ever a railway was made to that port,'' or a right for the British fleet to lie there.80 But 
Salisbury was displeased to share with MacDonald the latest information later in the 
same day from the Chinese Minister that the Yamen would not be satisfied with the 
abovementioned requirements as a result of Russian force and violent opposition.81 
Again, Salisbury switched his instruction to O’Conor, British ambassador to Russia, to 
have a cooperation with Russia to work together in China.82 
During a conversation two days later, Salisbury was protested by Russian ambassador 
that the British insistence on making Dalianwan an open port should encroach on the 
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Russia sphere of influence, and deny Russia future rights to the use of Port Arthur.83 
Meanwhile, another major apprehension of Salisbury was that Russia intended to 
cause some ports to be opened to her own imports rather than to other nations’. This, in 
Salisbury’s opinion, could obviously jeopardize British interests and violate the 
most-favored-nation clause which forbade China from giving Russia more favorable 
terms with regard to customs duties than those given to other Treaty Powers. Salisbury 
ordered O’Conor to work for an Anglo-Russian understanding which was desired in 
light of the events in China and Ottoman Empire, two fallen empires, but he reiterated: 
''We contemplate no infraction of existing rights. We would not admit the violation 
of any existing treaties, or impair the integrity of the present empires of either 
China or Turkey. These two conditions are vital. We aim at no partition of 
territory, but only a partition of preponderance.''84  
Whether the aim of ''a partition of preponderance'' refers to the admitting of Treaty 
Powers’ spheres of influence, it had appeared as a kind of paradox to Salisbury. On the 
one hand, he denied strongly when MacDonald proposed an understanding to 
recognize Russia’s sphere of influence in order to exchange the acknowledgment of 
Britain’s own sphere over the Yangzi region by Russia.85 On the other hand, he was 
very satisfied with the assurance from Zongli Yamen that ''Great Britain has always 
attached paramount importance to the retention of the Yangzi region….that no 
territory in any of the provinces adjoining the Yangzi shall ever be alienated to any 
other power by China.''86 The British traditional sphere of influence, in that case, 
finally acquired an official guarantee from China. 
By late February 1898, as all reports suggested, Germany was reported not to have 
claimed exclusive privileges in Shandong,87 and Port Arthur and Dalianwan would be 
open to the commerce of all the world.88 So it was not necessary to demand a port in 
Northern China to counterpoise Germany or Russia at that time. It is understandable as 
to why Salisbury responded immediately to MacDonald that ''The discussion of any 
proposal for the lease of Wei-hai Wei would accordingly be premature, provided the 
existing position is not materially altered by the action of other powers,'' again he 
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reiterated the policy which had been pursued with the aim of ''discouraging any 
alienation of Chinese territory'', in spite of an aroused British public.89  
According to the Chinese Customs Statistics, Great Britain carried 82 percent of the 
total trade with China under a foreign flag, and paid 76 percent of the dues and duties 
collected on that trade during the years of 1896 and 1898. 90  Obviously, British 
insistence on the integrity of China was not made out of any altruistic impulse for 
Chinese welfare but to ensure the free extension of trade.  
2.3 Tension in Liaodong Peninsular and Britain’s positive policy in China 
On 3 March 1898 Russia made a formal demand to China for a lease of the Liaodong 
Peninsula. This was vividly reported on 7 March, however, by The Times that Russia 
was threatening to send troops to Manchuria to enforce her demand for the lease of 
Port Arthur and Dalianwan, and that Russia could obtain the rights to send troops into 
Liaodong Peninsula in terms of protecting the engineers of the Trans-Manchurian 
Railway there. With all these assurances, as The Times said, ''Russia can convert either 
port into a second and stronger Vladivostok''91 which was acquired from the Qing in 
1860 and soon became the most important Russia's port in the Far East. As a matter of 
fact, as early as December of 1897, some intelligence indicated the phenomena of the 
whole of Manchuria almost becoming a necessary adjunct to Siberia, a region of 
Russia.92 It appeared that if Russia intended to transfer Port Arthur and Dalianwan as 
closed ports, as all the reports suggested, it would openly challenge the concept of the 
open door and damage commercial interests of Great Britain. 93  In addition, the 
Foreign Office was concerned that the takeover of Port Arthur, at the gates of Beijing 
so to speak, would allow Russia to exercise overwhelming influence in Beijing, as one 
Chinese Minister asserted, because no position in Northern China could compare with 
that port.94  
Arthur Balfour, who lacked Robert Salisbury’s imperturbability and well-known 
capacity for inaction,95 at the time in temporary charge of the government in the 
                                                          
89 FO 405/76, No. 215. Salisbury to MacDonald. February 25, 1898. 
90 FO 405/76, No. 123, Memorandum Communicated by Mr. J. Duncan, February 2, 1898. 
91 Times, March 7, 1898. Lingnan Library, Digital Archive 1785-1958. 
92 FO 405/76, No. 237, Extract from Times, December 20, 1897. 
93 Young, 68. 
94 FO 405/76, No. 330, Memorandum by Bertie. March 19, 1898. 
95 Young, 21. 
23 
absence of Salisbury, on 7 March 1898 immediately instructed MacDonald to demand 
first refusal on a lease of Wei-Hai-Wei since the influence of Russia and Germany 
over the Government of Beijing ''will be so increased to the detriment of that of Her 
Majesty’s Government.''96 Also, Balfour raised the requirement of the prolongation of 
the Burmese Railway into China as a counterpoise to the abovementioned 
Trans-Manchurian Railway.97 However, no official demands of Wei-Hai-Wei were 
raised to the Zongli Yamen until the end of March 1898. 
Persisting to maintain the integrity of China, Britain was still pursuing the reception of 
an assurance of being open to international trade from Russia. The information from 
O’Conor was that Russia insisted to possess an ice-free port in the Far East, but still 
would have liked to have Dalianwan opened to foreign trade like other ports in 
China.98 By 18 March 1898, the ambassador in St. Petersburg had been instructed to 
seek an assurance of equal rights under the terms of the Treaty of Tianjin. At the same 
time, MacDonald was ordered to pursue a similar intimation from the Chinese 
Government to make Port Arthur and Dalianwan Treaty ports but granting Russia 
special facilities for coaling and docking her ships of war.99 Britain further attempted 
to accept Russian take-over of Dalianwan and a rail extension for export as long as she 
relinquished the demand on Port Arthur, which was of little commercial value.100 In 
return, Great Britain compromised not to take a northern port, nor to interfere in 
Manchurian affairs, only if her treaty rights were respected.101  
Demurring any attack that Port Arthur could impact upon the sovereignty of China, 
Russia never made an official assurance to Britain, although O’Conor was informed 
many times by Russian ministers of the Treaty terms applied to Manchurian. The 
policy of the Russian government was, as O’Conor analyzed, once they obtained their 
demands, they started to strongly oppose any negotiation and compensatory demands 
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of the British government, which might bring the two countries to the verge of war.102 
To Britain, the acquisition of Port Arthur could alter the balance of power in the Gulf 
of Zhili and commence the partition of China, which would consequently endanger 
Britain’s basic principle of China.103 Great Britain, thus, had to take some positive 
actions to confront Russia’s political move in China in terms of its strategic and 
political significance.104 
From the perspective of MacDonald, Russian influence could not be increased by 
occupying and fortifying Port Arthur, nor did he believe the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei 
could make any difference with respect to the influence of Great Britain over the 
Beijing Government.105 Salisbury resolutely refuted such opinion in his telegraph by 
analyzing the military and strategic position Port Arthur occupied which inevitably 
could be considered as a standing menace to Beijing and the commencement of the 
division of China.106 Apparently, Salisbury tended towards that if no objection was 
proposed, the takeover of Port Arthur would definitely invite other Powers to follow, 
and ultimately could threaten British interests.107 
The consequent question that now perplexed the British Cabinet appeared to be what 
the appropriate objection would be. In discussion with MacDonald, Balfour 
contemplated a choice between two. 
''The one allowing Russia to lease Port Arthur subject to engagements to preserve 
existing treaty rights, and possibly, though this is doubtful, to refrain from 
fortifying Port Arthur, we taking as a make-weight a lease of Wei-hai-wei. The 
other requiring the Russians to abstain from leasing Port Arthur, we engaging to 
take no port in Gulf of Pechili and not to intervene in Manchuria.''108 
MacDonald opined, unless Britain ''is prepared to go to war'', she cannot stop the 
acquisition of Russia of a lease of Port Arthur and Dalianwan.109 At the same time, the 
agitation appeared to prevail in England both in the press and in official circles on the 
Russian action in China. The public opinion appeared to be thoroughly aroused and 
that ''there were combative spirit in the nation such as had scarcely manifested 
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themselves since the Crimean War.''110 An article in the ''Novoe Vremya'', one of 
Russia’s most widely-circulated newspapers and  ''the only source from which a very 
large number of people derive their knowledge of passing event ''111, also believed that 
no reason to suppose that ''the present crisis in the Far East will be settled in a peaceful 
manner.'' 112  Despite this, during the crisis over Port Arthur, Great Britain never 
seriously considered war as a possible solution.113  
2.4 British government’s political consideration upon Wei-Hai-Wei 
Wei-Hai-Wei, in the first instance, by no means the solitary consideration as a 
‘make-weight’ to Russia, Thornton Haven (Haiyang Island)114, Chushan, Silver Island 
(Jiaoshan) and Chongming Island were among those of possibilities to demand.115 As 
early as January 1898, Salisbury was informed that ''Weihaiwei, is absolutely of no 
value commercially.'' 116  MacDonald quoted the remarks of Alexander Buller, 
commander-in-chief of China station since May 1895, that ''there is no port in Gulf of 
Pechili which he considers suitable…however, that Talienwan, Port Arthur or 
Thornton Haven would suit.'' 117  Nevertheless, those three suitable ports are 
cartographically adjacent to Russia who had actually been anchoring squadrons since 
mid-December 1897. The best choice, therefore, in Buller’s opinion, ''is Chusan and 
all the islands round the mouth of the River Yang-tsze.''118 
Thornton Haven, probably an appropriate ‘make-weigh’ to Germany, was rejected 
because it was too limited in area to afford vessels up to three.119 The occupation of 
Zhoushan (Chusan) was raised as one of threats to prevent Chinese Government 
having the second indemnity loan made by Russia.120 And it was then proposed as a 
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counterpoise to the occupation of Port Arthur by O’Conor to avoid Russia turning it 
into a fortress.121  
In the telegraph to MacDonald on 12 March 1898, Salisbury demonstrated his opinion 
of Wei-Hai-Wei and Zhoushan. He repeated if satisfactory assurance of Britain Treaty 
rights can obtain from Russia, the British had no wish for special rights at 
Wei-Hai-Wei since ''the obligation of occupying it would be a costly one'', while 
Zhoushan was more preferred. 122  But he was resigned ''that the public will 
require…cartographic consolation in China…As a matter of course we have to do 
it.''123 He finally supported the idea that as for a makeweight to Port Arthur, a more 
suitable choice should be Wei-Hai-Wei which would establish Britain’s protection 
over Beijing and at the same time keep Jiaozhou and Port Arthur under surveillance.124  
Insofar, as Ian Nish points out, there was a lack of consultation in the events not only 
between Foreign Office and Admiralty, but also within Admiralty to its admirals on 
the China station. In the views of Admiralty, Weihaiwei, despite of some qualities of a 
base, was a less attractive and useful proposition than Port Arthur which can 
accommodate far more numbers of vessels. However, the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei was a 
political decision rather than the wishes of the British naval authorities.125  
As a matter of fact, in early 1898 the policy of ''counter-concessions'' advocated by 
Salisbury had to confront with opposition within the cabinet and press for a more 
positive policy, which was also wanted by the mercantile community who preferred 
the large-scale of British economic interests in China. 126  Criticism of the 
Government’s inactivity in the journals and newspapers, scurrilously outspoken, 
repeatedly called for a highly fiery action in the Far East, and some of the statesmen 
clamored for a war to defend British interests.127 Such vociferation earned echoes from 
Joseph Chamberlain, who was possibly the strongest figure of the Unionist 
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administration, who opined that taking Wei-Hai-Wei was too weak a course.128 He 
was now committing himself to search for an alliance with the United States and 
Germany to oppose Russia and France. Having failed in approaching the primary 
objects, his exploration successfully ended with the signing of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance in 1902, but Germany was generally regarded as the power mostly likely to 
cooperate. 129  The group in the Cabinet which favored Chamberlain’s program, 
therefore, was anxious not to antagonize Berlin by occupying a port proximate to 
Germany’s newly obtained Jiaozhou. Thomas Otte titled them the 
‘anti-Weihaiwei-party’ compared with the ‘Weihaiwei-party’, those led by Salisbury 
with the support of Curzon.130  
After long debates, the Foreign Office lobbied the recognition that ''If we desire to 
have some counterpoise to the preponderance of Russian and German influence at 
Peking we must have some point of advantage in the north'' rather than Zhoushan and 
Silver Island, in Britain’s preponderance sphere, can be taken whenever some other 
Power moves that way.131 The ‘Weihaiwei-party’ ultimately prevailed in the Cabinet. 
To MacDonald, whether the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei could be of significance to 
Britain’s influence over Beijing still was skeptical.132 What both the Premier and 
Minister confirmed was the port in Shandong which Germany regarded as its sphere of 
influence, would apparently provoke Germany. On the other hand, Britain was 
reluctant to see a German occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei, the effect of which, Salisbury 
remarked, would be very bad. In addition, the fear of potential cost at Wei-Hai-Wei 
also accounts for the hesitation of Britain’s action.133 Under such circumstances, on 22 
March 1898, Salisbury even put forward a suggestion not to occupy Wei-Hai-Wei so 
long as the China government could make a pledge not to alienate or lease to any other 
European Power.134   
2.5 A hasty protocol: the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei 
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The situation changed in a flash, obviously out of the control of Salisbury, when 
Russia threatened the Qing government with a force on the occupation of Port Arthur 
and Dalianwan if an Agreement was not signed by 27 March 1898. The news reached 
Salisbury just three days before Russia’s deadline, with no more time and maneuver 
left for Whitehall. After another debate in the Cabinet, the British government finally 
reached a consensus to ascertain the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei under the assistance of 
British fleets which was ordered to the Gulf of Zhili. The Admiralty arranged for the 
Rear-Admiral to proceed there at once with all ships in the north to support demands 
on Wei-Hai-Wei as well as to forestall Russian opposition.135 On 25 March 1898, 
MacDonald was informed to obtain ''in the manner you think most efficacious and 
speedy, the refusal of Wei-hai Wei on the departure of the Japanese.'' It was further 
stipulated that the terms should be similar to those granted to Russia for Port Arthur.136 
The reason for such kind of duration was to obviate further changes on the leasehold if 
''Russians convert their holding into perpetual possession or perpetual lease.''137  
On the second day, namely 26 March 1898, Salisbury authorized MacDonald to make 
a pledge to Germany that ''Wei-hai Wei is not at present, and cannot be, we believe, 
made a commercial port by which access can be obtained to any part of the province'' 
and Britain had no intention to interfere with the interests of Germany in that region.138 
In order to avoid potential resistance from Germany, the British announced that their 
action merely was compelled by Russian occupation of Port Arthur since the single 
goal was to ''maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili'' which was 
threatened by Russia’s action.139  Herr von Bulow, Secretary of German Foreign 
Affairs, stated that ''there would be many people, especially in Russia, who would not 
be slow to point out that the possession of Wei-hai Wei by England was directed, in the 
first instance, against Germany, and only in the second instance, against Russia.''140 
The British ambassador in Berlin, with the instruction of Salisbury, quickly proposed 
to Bulow an assurance by saying that there would be no attempt to construct railways 
in Shandong, or running through that province, if Wei-hai Wei obtained.  
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The demand to lease Wei-Hai-Wei, which seems of little difficulties by MacDonald 
and Salisbury in mid-March 1898,141 when it came to practice, was hesitated by the 
British Minister in Beijing, with his anxiety of a strong opposition from the Qing 
government.142 Zongli Yamen refused to give an immediate reply at the first three 
hours interview, MacDonald, however, experienced ''a great desire for friendship of 
England and for her support against Russia'' among those officials in Yamen whose 
major concern was that leasing Wei-Hai-Wei would leave Chinese ships without a 
suitable harbor to go and would cause counter-demands from other powers. Moreover, 
MacDonald reminded his London superior whether the pro-British feeling continued 
or changed, to a large extent, was determined by the pattern, either by force or by 
peace, Great Britain adopted to acquire Wei-Hai-Wei.143 
Salisbury did not favor the opinion of Anglo-philia atmosphere in Yamen who tried to 
reject Britain’s request and advice while granted to other Powers. He, nevertheless, 
would like to give the Qing assurance to use the harbor, provided the lease be granted. 
It was desirable for Salisbury to achieve the occupation at Wei-Hai-Wei as soon as 
possible, and he authorized MacDonald to be in full charge of the negotiations and 
informed the latter to keep in mind that ''time is important.''144 
2 April of 1898 was the final date on which Zongli Yamen must give a definite reply to 
the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei. The urgency of time evoked MacDonald’s complaint, ''I 
will do my best but time is so infernally short. Russia took 30 days. Cabinet give me 
seven.''145 He insisted great pressure like force of menace in Chefoo or the takeover of 
Zhoushan as a necessary (first step), must be undertaken to force the Yamen to yield. 
The British Minister therefore made it perfectly clear to the Chinese statesman that any 
delay upon the part of the Chinese Government in reaching a decision would be 
tantamount to a refusal and that ''the matter would then be out of his hands.''146 Grand 
Councilor Weng Tonghe indignantly recorded the two-hour interview on 31 March 
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1898, in which MacDonald pressed his demand with his usual unrelenting 
persistence.147 
Notwithstanding, a verbal approval was given by Yamen that China would lease 
Wei-Hai-Wei to England on the same terms as those of the lease of Port Arthur to 
Russia on the afternoon of the deadline date, viz. 2 April 1898. Still, of the concessions 
that the Yamen looked for from the British side, one was no more territorial demands, 
the other one was to arrange someone to train Chinese naval officers and soldiers at 
Wei-Hai-Wei. Considering French ambitions in Guangzhouwan and Britain’s 
intention to extend the defenses of Hong Kong, the term of ''no more territorial'' 
demands was rejected by Salisbury. While with regard to training the Chinese navy, 
the Admiralty supported the suggestions of Salisbury that it should be acceded to 
without any delay as Russia already had sent an officer to drill and organize Chinese 
troops in the north.148 Wei-Hai-Wei was still occupied by the Japanese who was 
scheduled to evacuate until they had acquired all of the indemnity from the Qing 
government, so that details of the agreement and takeover had to be made later. 
Although the British had already obtained consent from the Japanese government, 
whose future defense and promotion of interests would be assisted by the British 
government for the exchange of concurring to the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei,149 the 
British fleet was required to remain in the north until the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei 
was actually carried out. There is no evidence to suggest that London expected a 
warlike response from any of the Powers, nor China. The concentration of the 
squadron was the tactical arm of British power in the Far East aiding diplomacy.150 
Despite the presence of the British fleets and the fact that MacDonald’s intimidation 
had, to a large extent, accelerated the Qing’s concession, the British policy-makers 
reiterated to MacDonald to persuade the Yamen that the British had no intention to 
lease Wei-Hai-Wei if the Chinese could maintain it on their own, and all Britain did 
was for the welfare of China.151 Britain’s rhetoric appeared to have bewildered the 
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Zongli Yamen whose memorial stated that Britain’s lease of Wei-Hai-Wei was 
intended only to serve as a check on Russia so it ''seems to be quite true. It is not a case 
of sheer occupation without reason''152 when presenting the lease agreement to the 
Throne for approval, although Weng Tonghe in his diary expressed his personal 
reluctance and grudge on the subject.153 
2.6 Britain’s intention at Wei-Hai-Wei 
Before long the British government issued an official statement to fulfill its former 
assurance to Germany on 20 April 1898. 
''England formally declares that, in establishing herself at Wei-hai Wei, she has 
no intention of creating difficulties for her in that province. It is especially 
understood that England will not construct any railroad communication from 
Wei-hai Wei, and the district leased therewith, into the interior of the 
province.''154  
Such a declaration would circumscribe Wei-Hai-Wei’s commercial future, especially 
in the 1890s, the decade of railroad construction in China, which will be discussed in 
later chapters. Britain however voluntarily and willingly put forward, and publicized it 
in German newspapers, in order to satisfy the German government and to calm public 
opinion in Germany.155  
However, this declaration should not be attributed to Balfour himself, who as Thomas 
Otte claims tacitly supported Joseph Chamberlain’s foreign policy and was anxious to 
conclude some form of China agreement with Berlin. As discussed in the above 
paragraphs, the original pledge was drafted by Salisbury when he instructed the 
Beijing Minster in case the German ambassador would inquire as to the nature of 
British aims in Wei-Hai-Wei. Considering the urgency of time that Salisbury faced to 
counterpoise the threat of Russia, the assurance given to Germany should be regarded 
as a strategy to diminish the possible and potential obstructions.  
Another one-sided point lies in the second point Otte made, that due to the declaration, 
the value of Wei-Hai-Wei as a tool to keep Germany in check, as ever desired by 
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Salisbury and other diplomats, was largely reduced.156 It was indeed Salisbury and his 
‘Weihaiwei-party’ that predominated in the Cabinet and drove the decision of leasing 
Wei-Hai-Wei, but the port was the most appropriate choice for the British government 
to select upon the examination of all the available ones. Not until 30 March 1898, 
when received Balfour’s urgent message that the Cabinet was ''unanimous in the 
opinion that at all costs Wei-hai-wei must be obtained and that any retrogression on 
our part in this matter would have the worst effect possible on this country'' did 
Salisbury give his consent. 157  Furthermore, the paralysis of the policy-deciding 
displayed in March 1898 never indicated his attempt to have Germany involved or 
intervened in the subject. Thus, it should not be Salisbury’s real intention to check 
Germany by Wei-Hai-Wei, although this was stated by his ‘Weihaiwei-party’ when 
defending themselves in the Cabinet debates. 
Unlike some accounts of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei which received little practical 
advantages for Britain, 158  E-tu Zen Sun analyzed the procedure of the lease of 
Wei-Hai-Wei from the perspective of Anglophilia among the Chinese officials. 
Firstly, she maintains that Wei-Hai-Wei, with a quite good harbor, was by no means a 
useless or unimportant port on the north China coast, ranked second only to Port 
Arthur as a Chinese naval base, and that its acquisition was not a piece of 
muddle-headed diplomacy. She quotes the words of Charles Beresford, a British 
admiral and Member of Parliament, regarding Wei-Hai-Wei: ''I consider it an immense 
acquisition to our naval strength in the China seas.''159 The occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei 
was a logical choice, as long as the policy of counter-concessions was carried out by 
the British government, to obviate rival powers getting hold of and, consequently, 
dominating the entire north China.  
Secondly, she points out further that the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei was in accordance with 
the pro-British atmosphere among one group of Chinese high officials who even 
expected to establish closer relations with Britain and Japan in order to ward off the 
onslaughts of the continental powers. These included Zhang Zhidong (張之洞), Liu 
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Kunyi (劉坤一), Wang Wenshao (王文韶), and Sheng Xuanhuai (盛宣懷). Zhang 
once proposed an alliance with Britain. This received considerable support in the Qing 
court, but was turned down by MacDonald when he was sounded by Whitehall. 
Subsequently, another suggestion, in order to forestall further British demands and 
utilize the situation to China’s advantage, to have the Britain train the Chinese navy 
was raised by Zhang Zhidong in his letter to the Zongli Yamen. Sun stated that 
amongst the prevailing feeling of the Qing court before the formal negotiation for 
Wei-hai Wei: 
''Government circles buzzed with speculation as to what the British would 
demand as counterweight to the Russian and German acquisitions. It is 
significant that no one mentioned the possibility of rejecting in principle the 
demands that might be presented.''160 
Thus, regarding the Qing’s speedy consent to the British occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei, 
Sun inferred that the lease was not so strange an idea to the leading members of the 
Zongli Yamen as it had first appeared with some opposition voices. 
At the same time, Sun compares Robert Hart’s statement, which indicated that ''the 
Chinese Government would offer lease of Wei-hai Wei to British Government'' as 
early as 25 February 1898, to Sheng Hsuan-huai’s telegram bespeaking his favor of 
granting Wei-Hai-Wei to Britain as a check on the Russians and Germans and the 
success of his next ''secret move''. Although admitting the ambiguity in both 
statements, she claims that ''the British were far from uncertain of the outcome of the 
brief negotiations,''161 Sun concludes that Wei-Hai-Wei acted as a scapegoat of the 
attempt of Chinese officials to win British support to counterpoise Russia as well as to 
gain more friendship of Britain. On the other hand, the lease worked as a successful 
example for the British to take advantage of the Qing’s Anglo-philia, which was again 
strengthened through the provisions admitting the right of Chinese warships to use the 
harbor and providing British officers to help drill the men of these ships in the formal 
convention. 
In her British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers, Pamela Atwell challenged the 
abovementioned two standpoints of Sun. In the first place, although the lease of 
Wei-Hai-Wei was in no way an arbitrary nor a hasty decision, Atwell points out that 
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Lord Salisbury still preferred not to use China as an arena for settling the issue of 
Britain’s international prestige. On 4 May 1898, speaking at the Albert Hall, Salisbury 
presented his opinion: 
''The living nations will gradually encroach on the territory of the dying, and the 
seeds and causes of conflict among civilized nations will speedily appear….We 
shall not allow England to be at a disadvantage in any rearrangement that may 
take place. On the other hand, we shall not be jealous if desolation and sterility are 
removed by the aggrandizement of a rival in regions to which our arms cannot 
extend.''162 
One must notice that, the plea was not responded to, as Salisbury would have wished, 
because Chamberlain scathingly criticized the former’s policy which would damage 
Britain’s interests in China in the same newspapers just a few days later.163 The 
decision to lease Wei-Hai-Wei had been divided in parliament, thus Atwell 
summarized Whitehall’s opinion on Wei-Hai-Wei by citing Lord Curzon’s remarks 
''General reception of our case fair, not enthusiastic.''164 
In the second place, considering the complaints of MacDonald about not having 
sufficient time to work out an agreement, and the fact that Zongli Yamen finally did 
consent to British demands only after MacDonald had threatened them with military 
action which was obviously unaffordable pressure for this newly postwar country. 
Atwell insists that ''The negotiations were completed quickly, but this does not in itself 
mean that the Chinese were pleased to have the British occupy Weihaiwei.''165 Rather 
than Anglo-philia, the success in having provisions in favor of China’s naval ships 
written into the agreement, was a compromise reached by both Britain and China who 
''were being compelled by the force of events to make the best of a difficult 
situation.''166  
As already discussed, Salisbury did not favor MacDonald’s statement of Anglo-philia 
of the Yamen statesmen who would probably refuse the British requests of 
Wei-Hai-Wei but granted to other powers.167 Meanwhile, with the back of British 
fleets, MacDonald himself took little advantage of the ‘friendship for England’ with 
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his scathing tone and demanding requirements pressed on the Yamen in a very short 
time. It was hard to imagine the pro-British feeling took effect in practice. 
Just on the same day, namely, 2 April 1898, MacDonald reported his success with the 
Yamen on the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, the Foreign Office received the report of its 
strategic potential from the Admiralty, in which downgraded Wei-Hai-Wei as a 
vulnerable port except at some expense. Generally speaking, Wei-Hai-Wei in this 
report was nothing compared with Port Arthur. 168  Still, ''The fleet cannot return 
without good results in its pockets'', the First Lord of the Admiralty warned.169 It was 
also unrealistic to reverse a new requirement for the Foreign Office at that time. After 
a few delays, the transfer of Wei-Hai-Wei to Britain was scheduled on 24 May 1898, 
and a formal Anglo-Chinese Convention for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei should be 
signed on 1 July 1898. 
To conclude, in the period of carving up China, the British government, in control of 
Salisbury, was abstaining from further territorial requirements by the Powers, the 
''counter-concessions'' like the acquisition of Wei-Hai-Wei, a policy which does not 
commend itself. The transfer of China’s policy should be explained, as one observer 
noted ''as the disintegration of China has unfortunately already commenced, it would 
secure to England a share, and a preponderant share, in the partition.''170 Throughout 
the course of decision, it appeared some paradoxes and inconsistences in Salisbury’s 
instructions to his subordinates in Beijing and St. Petersburg. In the first instance, 
Salisbury favored that no territorial demands be considered. He approved neither the 
suggestions of a counterpoise to German and Russian action by O’Conor in December 
1897, nor the earlier favorable hint of a ready leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei from 
MacDonald on 25 February 1898. Although the two ministers seemed united in a 
conspiracy to urge the Government to accept Russia’s action and to follow a policy of 
sphere of influence, seeking compensation in the Yangzi region,171 Salisbury was 
reluctant to have himself admitted to the idea of sphere of influence. When the crisis of 
Port Arthur arose, the Ministers in Beijing and St. Petersburg nevertheless efficiently 
executed the orders from Cabinet - O’Conor made efforts to pursue an Anglo-Russian 
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understanding regarding Port Arthur, however, failed; MacDonald succeeded in 
obtaining a verbal approval of the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei in a very limited time.  
The decision-making of the British government also explicated instability and some 
division in the Cabinet. Meanwhile, without a comprehensive consultation from the 
Royal Navy and admirals on the China station, Wei-Hai-Wei could not perhaps have 
served as the most appropriate port in terms of a naval base.172 But those factors should 
not act as indicators of ''the irrationality'' of the British Empire.173 The acquisition of 
Wei-Hai-Wei illustrates the transition when abandoning of policy the maintaining 
China integrity in order to protect British commercial interests. It also demonstrates 
the interaction between the London supervisors and local British Ministers to cope 
with the changing situation in China. Wei-Hai-Wei was taken largely because of those 
‘Weihaiwei-party’ who obviated a war with Russia and expected to maintain British 
influence in the north of China. When the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei was defended in 
Parliament in April 1898, Balfour emphasized the need to maintain Great Britain’s 
commercial influence in the east, while Salisbury was more outspoken. He presented 
the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei, as a counterpoise to Russia, and manifested that 
Britain never dismiss its rivalry and interests in northern China.174  
It remains now in what way the remote decision-makers intended to conduct and 
implement administration in the newly acquired territory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
172 Nish, The Royal Navy and The Taking of Weihaiwei, 1898-1905, 85-86. 
173 Davis and Gowen, The British at Weihaiwei: A Case Study in The Irrationality of Empire. 87. 
174 Parliamentary Debates, 4th Series, lvi, Cols. 165-74. Ding Mingnan edited,67. 
37 
Chapter 3 Administrative design and transfer in 1898-1902 
It took over three years for the British policy-makers to determine the functions, thus 
the administration of Wei-Hai-Wei. This chapter will explore the initial expectations 
of the leased territory and why the frequent transfer happened in the charging 
departments. The unimpressive situation, the Colonial Office faced, when it took over 
Wei-Hai-Wei will be introduced as well. 
3.1 The initial disputed expectations of Wei-Hai-Wei in 1898 
Wei-Hai-Wei, in the terms of the Convention for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, was 
leased on the 1st July, 1898 to Great Britain by China to provide the British navy with 
a suitable naval harbor in north China, and for the better protection of British 
commerce in the neighboring seas. This lease was to run for so long a period as Port 
Arthur remained under the occupation of Russia.175 
The total territory occupied 285 square miles, and consisted of a strip of the mainland 
ten miles deep surrounding a bay (called by the Chinese as ‘the horns of the cow') in 
the north-east corner of the province of Shandong, and some islands, of which the 
largest is Liu-gong. Liu-gong Island lies to the east and west across the bay and so 
forms an extensive harbor with good and safe anchorage for a large number of vessels 
of deep draught. The mainland, with an area of roughly 270 square miles, consisted of 
barren-looking hills of various altitudes.176 Unlike the mainland strip, Liu-gong Island, 
originally purchased by the Admiralty and the War office at a cost of ￡25,000, was 
the private property of the British Government.177 
According to the Convention for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, within the territory east of 
the meridian 121.4, the British government was authorized with certain military rights 
such as to erect fortifications, build station troops or take any other measures necessary 
for defensive purposes, under certain circumstances. That means Britain can extend 
their sphere of influence to 1,500 square miles in Shandong Province. But it turned out 
that British government never consider to extend its boundary and sphere of influence 
in these areas.  
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There were about 275 villages in the ceded territory, however, the exact population 
varied in different reports.178It is safe to say that the population should have been no 
more than 150,000 and no less than 80,000 when the territory was leased. Prior to 
British administration, over ninety-five percent of the population in Wei-Hai-Wei were 
peasants and had been living in villages.179As for the nationality of Chinese residents 
living within the British area, G. T. Hare, Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Federated 
Malay State, now Acting Assistant British Commissioner at Wei-Hai-Wei, suggested 
they should still be "regard as retaining their Chinese nationality so that it is apparently 
necessary to regard Chinese residents in Wei-Hai-Wei, when abroad or outside the 
territory, as Chinese subjects retaining their allegiance to the Emperor of China, and 
not as British subjects."180 The Foreign Office and the Colonial Office both concurred 
with the above view.181 
Once in possession, the British found that Wei-Hai-Wei had some fatal geographical 
drawbacks for military defense: besieged by Port Arthur to the north and Qingdao on 
the south, the Royal Navy considered Wei-Hai-Wei to be worthless in wartime.182 
Meanwhile, according to the Admiralty's assessment, which arrived on 2 April 1898, 
Wei-Hai-Wei was a "large open bay, with the disadvantage that the greater part of it is 
too shallow for shipping, and that it presents its open mouth to northerly gales, which 
are not of infrequent occurrence in the winter."183 In addition, Liu-gong Island which 
is extending two and a quarter miles across the entrance of the bay, offered some 
protection but not enough to lessen the risk of any severe military attack. 184 
Concretely, "the harbor is somewhat too open to winds from the south east, and to 
render it secure from bad weather (or an enemy), it would require the construction of 
an expensive breakwater at its east entrance."185 Under these considerations, the value 
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of Wei-Hai-Wei varied from time to time in naval views, and the necessity of the 
fortification of the harbor was frequently in question.186 
On the other hand, there were some advantages of this new territory: in the first place, 
Wei-Hai-Wei was free of crime. "The natural character of the Chinese peasants here is 
exceptionally peaceful and honest, and there are no turbulent clans here continually 
fighting with each other as in the south of China."187 What's more, the labor in 
Wei-Hai-Wei was very cheap. Hare even wrote that "there is, perhaps, no place in 
China occupied by foreigners where labor is so cheap."188 
As far as the economic conditions in Wei-Hai-Wei in the late nineteenth century were 
concerned, it was very disappointing. The people in Wei-Hi-Wei were wretchedly 
poor, just like other places in Shandong Province. The poverty in this province of 
northern China was so astonishing that the Commissioner of Customs at Chefoo 
wrote: "The distress has been so great that parents have had to sell their children of all 
ages at unprecedentedly low figures in order to produce food."189 
Some observers, although admitting its poverty, evaluated the prospects of 
Wei-Hai-Wei as positive. As Lewis reported, "We have started a splendid territory at 
Wei-Hai-Wei, but it is totally undeveloped excepting in agriculture and fishing. By 
carefully assisting the inhabitants, without interfering with them more than can be 
helped, we can make the place much more wealthy and convenient." 190 Obviously, 
Lewis's assumption represented an ideal future for Wei-Hai-Wei, but he neglected the 
adversities of local agriculture which was carefully recorded by Johnston. "The land is 
not unfertile, but the agricultural area is somewhat small, for the country is very hilly. 
Like the greater part of north China, Shantung is liable to floods and droughts, and 
local famines are not uncommon."191 Johnston continued to write that "Considering 
that agriculture is the occupation of all but a small portion of the people, and that large 
areas in the territory are wholly unfit for cultivation, this population must be regarded 
as very large, and its size can be only be explained by the extreme frugality of the 
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people and the almost total absence of a leisured or parasitic class."192As early as the 
instant of Britain's occupation, Salisbury even asserted that, as there was no trade in 
Wei-Hai-Wei, customs duties in this port were out of the question.193 The economic 
depression in Wei-Hai-Wei influenced a lot during policy-making as we will see in 
later paragraphs.  
One of the most appropriate remarks on the situation of Wei-Hai-Wei probably was 
made by Lewis: "The sum of the whole is that Wei-hai-wei has the makings of a very 
pleasant place, but that at present it is in a very initial stage of development."194Had the 
military or economical situations been better, this territory would not have transferred 
so frequently among various authorities.  
3.2 Administration design and frequent transfer among British authorities 
At the beginning of the lease, the administration was first undertaken by a Senior 
Naval Officer of the Royal Navy, Vice-Admiral Edward Hobart Seymour, the new 
commander-in-chief, who had in February 1898 taken over from Buller at Zhoushan. 
But daily administrative responsibilities were carried out by Captain King-Hall and 
Commander Gaunt. Their work was confined to the island and Matou (Port Edward). 
In 1899, it was transferred to a Military and Civil Commissioner appointed by the War 
Office, firstly Arthur Dorward (1899–1901) appointed by the War Office. Since 1901, 
the Colonial Office started to take over the administration from the War Office, and 
Arthur Dorward was appointed as the Civil Commissioner under the Wei-Hai-Wei 
Order in Council of 1901. Sidney Barton, after carrying out much excellent pioneering 
work, rejoined the Foreign Office, and G. T. Hare from the Civil Service of Straits 
Settlements succeeded him as Acting Assistant British Commissioner. 
At the close of 1901, the War Office decided to abandon fortifying Wei-Hai-Wei, and 
transferred Dorward to Shanghai, and the Colonial Office appointed James Lockhart, 
from the Hong Kong Civil Service, to act as Commissioner in this place.195Johnston 
evaluated the early authorities in Wei-Hai-Wei as "it can hardly be said to have been 
administrated during that time, for the whole territory beyond Liu-gong Island and 
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little mainland settlement of Ma-tou (then Port Edward) was almost entirely left to its 
own devices."196 
The initial governance of Wei-Hai-Wei was related to more than three departments 
and a variety of staffs. Those like the Colonial Office, the War office, Admiralty, 
Commander and acting Commissioners, were all involved in the discussion of the 
future of this new territory. Hundreds of correspondence, cabinet papers, and reports 
regarding proposals of Wei-Hai-Wei were communicated among those bureaus and 
officers especially in the first five years.  
Shortly after taking over, the following question was how the territory should be 
administrated. It actually took a couple of years to transfer Wei-Hai-Wei to the 
Colonial Office as there was no immediate definite decision on the administration of 
the territory. However, it was proposed by John Ardagh, Director of Military 
Intelligence, that Wei-Hai-Wei should come under the Colonial Office as early as the 
beginning of its tenancy no matter what may be the nature of the provisional 
administration.197 
3.2.1 Two separate administration systems 
The Director of Military Intelligence admitted that "the extent of the territory to be 
leased for purpose of defense and occupation is more difficult to define, in the absence 
of detailed surveys".198 Owing to its military geography and naval value, a navy base 
was one major consideration. The Intelligence Division therefore suggested that in 
some degree two parallel and distinct governances should exist on the islands and 
mainland. There were possibilities to construct the shore and islands to be a naval base 
with all its accessories, forts, and batteries left by the Chinese and Japanese garrisons, 
whereas the mainland was served as a defensive belt or zone allowing diversity of 
cultivation, residents' dwellings and other facilities under the control of the British 
local administration.199 This blueprint of two separate administrations was under 
consideration in the following three years (1898-1900). 
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In the initial annexation, the Liu-gong Island which was entirely purchased by the War 
office and Admiralty, ruled by a governor named A. Gaunt, authorized financial 
support by the Naval Commander-in-Chief. The rest of the territory was postponed to 
determine demarcation with the Chinese government. 200  It was emphasized in a 
primary memorandum on Wei-Hai-Wei that military considerations must be of great 
importance in such an isolated and distant possession as well as so near to possibly 
hostile forces, regardless what decision finally can be made with respect to the 
administration of the harbor.201 
Colonel Dorward, the military commissioner in Wei-Hai-Wei, proposed civil 
administration in his letter to the War office that 
"The best method of providing for what may be called, the Municipal 
Government of the island, and the War office and Admiralty property on the 
mainland, would be to form it into a Cantonment on the Indian lines, under a 
Cantonment Magistrate."202 
Frank Swettenham, Secretary for Malay Affairs, who had great experience of colonial 
administration, was sent to conduct a detailed field-work under the request of 
Chamberlain. Swettenham stated his perspective that Liu-gong Island should be 
considered separately for its naval purpose so that it should not be thrown open to the 
public or other aims. He took it that Wei-Hai-Wei was essentially a naval station with 
naval interests prevailing on the island, the governance in the island, thus, should be 
under completely Admiralty rather than a dual control which worked then with 
military.203 
Though in favor of the most part of Swettenham's report, Chamberlain held a negative 
attitude toward the former's suggestion on the separate governance of Liu-gong Island 
since it would be a separation likely to increase the burden on States Finance. It 
appeared to Chamberlain to be simpler and more likely conducive to the economy if 
the view of treating the island and mainland as one for financial and other purposes 
was adopted. His principle regarding Wei-Hai-Wei was well delivered in one letter 
that stated 
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"He [Chamberlain] considers that military and naval considerations should be 
paramount, and that subject to such considerations the administration should, at 
the outset at any rate, be as inexpensive as possible, seeing that the prospects of 
obtaining substantial revenue are very slightly, and the cost of the dependency 
will in the main fall upon the Imperial Exchequer."204 
Obviously, he never intended to invest too much in this remote, isolated territory of the 
British Empire. As for the policy of crew size in Wei-Hai-Wei, for instance, 
Chamberlain anticipated that it should be necessary, for some time at least, to confine 
the civil staff of the dependency to the narrowest possible limit, he thus did not satisfy 
the proposal of a separate Judge there which probably implied an additional 
expenditure.205 
As for the expenditure in the territory, Lord Lansdowne inclined to agree with Colonel 
Dorward's proposal that those of Civil and Military should be kept distinct from the 
first instant, and the municipal administration should not be involved in the Army 
Votes.206Lord Lansdowne, nevertheless, presumed that the emoluments attaching to 
the duties of "Cantonment Magistrate" on the island of Liu-gong should be provided 
by the Colonial Office. 207  It was obvious that Chamberlain denied Lansdowne's 
request by stating that the administration of Wei-Hai-Wei had not yet been taken by 
this department, while he insisted that such expense should be charged upon Army 
Funds.208 
It was understandable that Joseph Chamberlain rejected the Colonial Office to sanctify 
the expenditure request of repairs and improvements of existing buildings and 
prisoner's facilities on Liu-gong Island, with the possibility for it to run by a joint 
military and naval board, until the civil administration was confirmed.209 
A specific example showed that, while confronted with objections from the Colonial 
Office with respect to some of the maintenance of the lights, the Admiralty had to 
concur to be responsible for such expenditures until the 31st March 1901, the moment 
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the Admiralty presumed that those provisions for service should be made by the 
Colonial Office.210 
As a matter of fact, the Colonial Office had already saved a lot of expenditures in the 
first two years of the takeover. A low cost of Civil Establishment was possible as 
assistance services were largely carried out by clerical staff and launches of the the 
War office and the Admiralty with their own funds. The public works of the settlement 
and the medical and sanitary work, for instance, were entirely carried out by the Royal 
Engineers and the Royal Army Medical Staff.211 
Chamberlain finally decided that the civil administration should be taken over by the 
Colonial Office as soon as the necessary arrangements could be made.212 No more 
details were explained regarding the necessary arrangements in the records. However, 
it appeared that Chamberlain was very prudent to take any further steps until a detailed 
survey report was done by one who was familiar both with the general system of 
colonial administration and Chinese experience. Thus, he instructed Swettenham to 
start field work as soon as the territory was transferred to the Colonial Office.213 In the 
same letter to Swettenham, he expressed his expectation that Wei-Hai-Wei should be 
self-supporting from the beginning regardless of having comparatively unstable and 
lower revenue from local economics. Considering its special circumstances, different 
characters of the population and its distance away from Hong Kong, Joseph 
Chamberlain, the government's Colonial Secretary at the Colonial Office, suggested 
that Wei-Hai-Wei should not be connected with Hong Kong, and that a military or 
naval officer was qualified to be the head of the new territory.214 
Realizing its potential commercial value was desirable and that Wei-Hai-Wei would 
be under civil administration, the War Office still tried to persuade the Military 
Commissioner that the future development of Wei-Hai-Wei should not be to the 
detriment of military and naval interests or curtail the military property and control on 
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the island.215The War Office expressed support to these views with respect to the 
future administration being executed by the Colonial Office on December 1900.216the 
War office "concurs generally in the views that the territory could most properly be 
governed by a Military or Naval Governor."217 
Not long before, the Admiralty presented their agreement on the arrangements of the 
transfer when they realized naval interests should not be infringed. However, the 
Admiralty emphasized the necessity to preserve Liu-gong Island solely under the 
jurisdiction of Naval Authorities owing to the potential of the man-of-war 
anchorage.218 
The hesitation in the design of Wei-Hai-Wei, in a certain extent, implies that there was 
no specific goal for this new acquired leased territory.  
3.2.2 A counterpart of Hong Kong? 
As the second territory acquired in China, compared to the treaty ports which remained 
Chinese territory, Wei-Hai-Wei was inevitably always compared with Hong Kong. 
The latter was also usually served as a reference when London's policy-makers were 
contemplating the government in Wei-Hai-Wei. Moreover, it seemed like a common 
recognition that the principle of ruling the mainland of Wei-Hai-Wei was to interfere 
as little as possible with the existing organization, as Britain did in Kowloon. 
Though the Law Office once assumed that Wei-Hai-Wei was part of the British 
dominions and they proposed administration of justice taking the precedent of Hong 
Kong,219 their proposal soon was vetoed by the War Office. It was clear that the British 
"Government had decided that the territories in question should not be treated as part 
of Her Majesty's dominions."220 Besides the technical difficulties of challenging the 
term of "leasehold" in the convention, the reasons to acknowledge Wei-Hai-Wei as "a 
foreign country", given by the Foreign Office, were to follow the example of Germany 
and Russia as well as to avoid increasing the scrambling for concessions which might 
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contribute to the break-up of China.221 The Foreign Office further supplemented their 
concerns that Wei-Hai-Wei "will be handed back to China if, and when, Russia gives 
up Port Arthur"222, which were stipulated in the Convention. This approach was also in 
part owing to an agreement concluded with Germany in accordance with which both 
Britain and Germany "agree not to take advantage of the present complications to 
obtain any territorial advantages for themselves in China, and to invite other Powers 
interested to give a similar undertaking."223 
British policymakers seemed not to have the intention of risking the British position in 
nominally threatening the integrity of China, although several coastlands and regions 
along the Yangzi River, almost the best commercial territory of this old country, had 
already been controlled by Powers in terms of "Leasehold", "Concession" and 
"Colony". An incorporation precedent to the British colony of Hong Kong in the case 
of Kowloon, the expansion of which was coterminous with the boundary of the 
previous territory of Hong Kong, was not applicable to Wei-Hai-Wei owing to its 
position thousands miles from the nearest British Colony. 224  Still, the British 
government expected full and complete jurisdiction within the new territory. 
Therefore, an analogy reference to Cyprus, which was not British territory but was still 
under British administration, was under discussion.225 
On the other hand, Chamberlain once intended to regard Wei-Hai-Wei as with the case 
of Kowloon, which was treated as a British possession, rather than of Cyprus. In his 
mind, the first of January 1901 was a suitable date for commencing control over 
Wei-Hai-Wei by the Colonial Office. He even supported the notion that British control 
should include the walled town of Wei-Hai-Wei, which was stipulated in the 
convention for the Lease of Wei-Hai-Wei as "within the walled city of Wei-Hai-Wei 
Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction, except so far as may be 
inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defense of the territory 
leased", thereby greatly facilitating the work of administration.226 His proposal, of 
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course, received little approval from the cabinet. As for incorporating the walled city, 
it turned out that that never came true.  
Finally, according to the agreement, the leased territory of Wei-Hai-Wei would not be 
treated as part of the British dominions, but as a foreign country within which Britain 
had "by treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance and other lawful means" 
jurisdiction. The Order in Council was accordingly drafted in the Foreign Office on 
general lines of the Cyprus Order in Council of September 14, 1878.227 
3.2.3 Abandon Wei-Hai-Wei as a naval base 
When it came to the draft Wei-Hai-Wei's order in Council, the Admiralty hoped to 
insert the independent jurisdiction in Liu-gong Island as a formal clause. Evan 
MacGregor, Permanent Secretary to the Admiralty, in defense of his department, 
wrote that 
"Experience has shown that it is essential, in the first formal Regulations of a new 
Colony where naval interests are one of the most important considerations, to 
include clauses distinctly reserving the necessary powers to the Admiralty."228  
The Admiralty even requested the Colonial Office to include specific demands in the 
draft clause in order to demonstrate the naval interests in Wei-Hai-Wei. They 
emphasized that  
"On the representation of the Naval C.-in-C. (Commander-in-Chief), the 
Commissioner shall [from time to by Ordinance] alter the limits of the 
Admiralty waters. The naval Authority will make such regulation as will permit 
of the use of Admiralty Waters by Mercantile Vessels, so far as is necessary."229 
The Colonial Office opposed apparently to the proposals mentioned above by pointing 
out that it was unusual, unnecessary and inconsistent to regulate the power and 
position assigned to the Commissioner by the Order in Council, in spite of 
acknowledging the rationality for the Commissioner to carry out the will of the Naval 
Officer Command-in-Chief.230 
However, the Admiralty Department insisted that the definite and legal rights of Naval 
Service should be indicated in the first instance because of "the occupation of 
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Wei-Hai-Wei having been dictated primarily by reasons of naval policy."231 In order to 
prevent delays and difficulties, as had happened at Malta, Simon' Bay and Esquimalt, 
in obtaining subsequent recognition by the Colonial Authorities of Admiralty control 
over anchorage necessary for the service of the fleet. Meanwhile, the Admiralty made 
a concession through altering some wording, requesting the concurrence of the 
Colonial Office when there was any change with respect to Admiralty waters.232 It 
must have come as good news to the Admiralty when the Colonial Office and the War 
Office concurred with the former's final amendment and wrote it into the ‘The 
Wei-hai-wei Order in Council 1901'.233 
Up to August of 1901, it appeared that military and naval value was still a major 
concern in the Whitehall. Although his proposal of a separate military administration 
in Liu-gong Island was rejected, Dorward put forward a plan to rebuild a new town to 
receive native population who were removed from naval property. In his view, "when 
the new town is built, the Civil Administration should only be concerned with its care 
and the Admiralty and the War office should be left to administer their own property. 
A division of authority between the Civil Administration and the Navy over any area 
will not work."234 He therefore recommended the appointment of an officer of the 
garrison to act as Cantonment Magistrate in this town. He explained more 
responsibilities of the Cantonment Magistrate, who "should be entrusted with the 
collection of the Island Revenue, the charge of the Civil Police and the native town, 
and be given power to magisterially deal with breaches of the Island bye-laws and 
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regulations."235 At the end of his letter, he emphasized that the magistrate of the new 
town did not mean he turned over in any degree the civil and judicial control which he 
at present posed.236 
It cannot be denied that Wei-Hai-Wei was occupied as a counterpoise to Russia at the 
beginning owing to its importance as a military and naval base in Northern China. 
However, in August 1901 the principle and major value of the territory were ultimately 
revised by in Whitehall. Receiving concurrence with the War Office and the 
Admiralty, Mr. Brodrick, Sectary of State for War made modifications with respect to 
military arrangements at Wei-Hai-Wei on the following principles: 
"(i) That the port should be maintained only as a flying naval base for His 
Majesty's fleet for use in a war with China, or a non-naval power. 
(ii) That, in the event of war between this country and one or more naval powers, 
the abandonment of the port may be necessary. 
(iii) That the garrison should be limited to the strength necessary to furnish 
sentries over the naval stores and sick quarters. 
(iv) That, further expenditure on fortifications and armament of the port should 
cease."237 
Brodrick further presumed the above proposal should have succeeded with a decrease 
for the police work on the mainland. He believed that "it is important that the garrison 
should be no larger than is absolutely necessary, so that in case of evacuation on an 
emergency, the whole personnel could be moved to HK without difficulty, by one of 
His Majesty's ships."238 An immediate result was the necessity of the maintenance of 
the Chinese Regiment, which then accounted for more than a thousand troops, being 
decreased to 200 soldiers. The suggestions of Brodrick well testified to Balfour's 
assumption that "If obtained, (Wei-Hai-Wei) would be worth little to us if fortified and 
still less if unfortified."239 
The shift from a naval base to an abandoned port totally changed its original military 
and naval purpose of Wei-Hai-Wei advocated by the Admiralty and the War Office. 
Atwell pointed out that the reason for this shift was due to the financial burden of 
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fortifying this isolated dependency as well as the urgency to spend more constructively 
on warships.240 Indeed, the First Lord of the Admiralty wrote in 1902: 
"What we want are more ships, and every penny that is spent on bricks and 
mortar and land fortification, which could be spent on more ships, is money 
unnecessarily and badly spent. Every garrison that we have to lock up hundreds 
and thousands of miles away from this country is an evil…"241  
Britain at this time anxiously faced both the threat of "the German navy menace" and 
the Franco-Russian Dual Alliance.242 Therefore, an increasing expenditure on naval 
and ship construction was more reasonable compared to investment in such debatable 
leased territory as Wei-Hai-Wei. 
As the station was not to be fortified, but only to be used as a flying fleet, the question 
was how to arrange the future garrison and governance of Wei-Hai-Wei. Therefore, an 
inter-departmental conference, with representatives from the Admiralty, the War 
office and the Colonial Office, was held on January 20, 1902. Receiving little 
objections, a conclusion was peacefully reached as follows: 
"1. That no garrison is now required for defense purposes on the Island, the 
Admiralty having decided not to retain there a large amount of stores. 
2. That the responsibility for the maintenance of order both in the Island and on 
the mainland should devolve on the Colonial Office. 
3. That pending the organization of a local force by the Colonial Office for the 
maintenance of order, the War Office should keep at Wei-Hai-Wei for the next 
12 months a force of not less than 300 officers and men, but as soon as the above 
organization is completed, no military garrison will be needed at Wei-Hai-Wei. 
 4. That under these circumstances it would appear that no land and   buildings on 
either island or mainland will in future be required by the War Office, and that all 
such lands and buildings at present in the War office possession might be 
transferred to the Colonial Office; similarly all lands and buildings, and the 
property of the Admiralty, not actually required or likely to be required in the 
near future by the Admiralty, might be handed over to the Colonial Office."243 
Raised from the outset, the take-over of Wei-Hai-Wei by the Colonial Office 
eventually came to an agreement after four years. Wei-Hai-Wei was, in other words, 
abandoned by the War Office and the Admiralty since then because of its little 
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importance for military defense. In March 1901, the construction of fortifications in 
Liu-gong Island was stopped, "which once was in the first instance determined on and 
carried almost to completion on the recommendation of Admirals." 244  Neither a 
separate administration in Liu-gong Island, nor a military Commissioner was required. 
The Colonial Office was authorized to carry out its own arrangements about this new 
territory. And the urgent question facing the Colonial Office was how to change this 
remote and poor dependency into a commercial port and make it a self-supporting and 
prosperous port. 
3.3 Unimpressive commercial prospects faced the Colonial Office 
The ‘disappointing' economic situation of Wei-Hai-Wei was mentioned briefly in the 
previous paragraphs of the background information of the territory when the British 
took control of it, but it might be as well provide a more detailed discussion here, since 
it played an important role in affecting the policy adopted by London's policy-makers 
as well as in the process of development at Wei-Hai-Wei. In fact, its economy was 
well documented by some pioneers, travelers and officers who had been there. 
F. Swettenham, who was sent specially in 1900 to report on Wei-Hai-Wei for the 
benefit of the Colonial Office, did not form a high opinion of its resources.  
"The soil is very poor, and only produces just enough to keep the people alive. 
There are no exports except some salt fish to Formosa, and the imports are limited 
to sugar, tobacco, paper, and timber. Beyond this there is no trade, and no prospect 
of any, unless the wild silk of the district, which is now collected and exported to 
Chefoo and should eventually be shipped from Weihaiwei……The existence of 
minerals is not known and very doubtful."245 
Acting for about a year as Assistant Commissioner, Mr. G. T. Hare "with unique 
knowledge of Chinese men and matters", was able to observe the territory 
comprehensively.246 "The country for a hundred miles odd round the Weihaiwei 
settlement is, perhaps, almost the poorest in the whole China" 247 , he therefore 
concluded a low value of the leased territory to the British based on his own enquiries 
to European and Chinese traders, and other traders in Shanghai, North China, and 
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locally.248The traditional resources of local revenue, mainly comprised by land tax, 
had little potential to increase on its original amounts due to the infertility of the soil, 
which was largely covered with sand and broken stones. Hare asserted that the soil in 
Wei-Hai-Wei ranked the lowest in value among all the assessed rents in the eighteen 
provinces of China.249Hare remarked in his report that "the prospect of trade are most 
discouraging" as a result of the despondency of attracting outside investors as well as 
encouraging local economy, which was out of native bankers and large pawnshops.250 
The British government must face the fact that this distant dependency was likely to be 
a financial burden - though probably a small one - on the Imperial funds. Arthur 
Balfour ridiculed in Parliament those "foolish enough" to look for profit out of the 
leasehold.251 His satire reflected a common opinion of Wei-Hai-Wei, namely that it 
was "absolutely of no commercial value."252 Wei-Hai-Wei possessed no competitive 
advantages in terms of its commercial aspects, but all observers agreed on one point in 
its favor: its climate was superb.253 The temperate climate actually was one of the 
major advantages of Wei-Hai-Wei mentioned in various works. It was described in a 
Foreign Office handbook as "good, the summer heat never being excessive and the 
winter being cold, dry, bracing, and exhilarating"--in a word, "exceptionally healthy," 
a view held even today by many tourists.254 There was not much change in rainfall 
annually which occurred usually in summer. For the years 1900 to 1916, the mean 
temperature at Wei-Hai-Wei during the hottest month of August was 76°F, and while 
in the coldest February during the same period, the mean temperature was 30°F.255 
Johnston wrote: "the average year in Wei-Hai-Wei contains a greater number of ‘fine 
days' - when the sun shines and no rain falls - than the average year in England."256 J. F. 
Lewis, a colonel in the Royal Engineers and member of the surveying party in the 
territory, concluded in December 1899 that "on the whole, the climate is probably one 
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of the best of all our military stations" despite sometimes there were damp days and 
mildew attacks.257 He suggested that the entertainment infrastructures for cricket, 
tennis, and golf be considered, and hotels, parks, and roads surrounding the coast be 
constructed.258 While criticizing its economic performances, Swettenham spoke of the 
goodness of its climate on the other hand by "comparing with other places in China 
occupied by Europeans," which should make it a popular health resort.259 He remarked 
that "In summer the heat is never high and, in the absence of wind and rain, the climate 
is almost perfect."260 Besides, Swettenham commended the advantages of local labor, 
which was "plentiful, cheap, and easily being managed"; and the harbor which was 
"perhaps the best on the coast between Hong Kong and Talienwan (Dalianwan)."261 
Hare also praised the climate of Wei-Hai-Wei as perhaps the best in China because of 
the salubrious temperature and moderate rainfall annually. Free from epidemic disease 
and with its beautiful nature, Wei-Hai-Wei could have been a good health resort in 
summer.262 On the other hand, he thought that Wei-Hai-Wei, even as a summer resort, 
"will have to compete with Japan, the old established Treaty port of Chefoo, and the 
rising watering-place of Pei Ta Ho (Beidaihe 北戴河) in the north."263 At the end of the 
report, Hare proposed specific funds to develop physical infrastructures at the 
Settlement by making public gardens, promenade piers and planting trees along the 
shores, etc.264 He claimed that the Government, rather than private enterprise, should 
play a leading role in developing eastern stations.265 
With this discovery the British found their rationale for staying in Wei-Hai-Wei: To 
convert it into "a paradise," meaning a sanitarium or a health resort where they could 
enjoy the only advantage of the place - its weather, especially in summer months.266 
One should agree with Atwell that the finest weather attracted the British Admiralty to 
retain Wei-Hai-Wei as a sanatorium and recreation area for the fleet long after the plan 
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for a fortified naval base was abandoned.267 To this end, a number of properties on the 
island of Liu-gong soon was purchased by the Admiralty and facilities started to be 
constructed for the training and summer recreation of the China squadron sailors.268 
During its 32 year leasehold, a summer resort was indeed a priority function of 
Wei-Hai-Wei. It was visited by the China Squadron of the British Fleet every summer, 
because it was a perfect place to carry out target-practice or exercise ashore and afloat 
for the Naval Commander-in Chief.269 Also, Wei-Hai-Wei provided a congenial coast 
and some natural Sulphur springs for European summer visitors, who tried to escape 
the damp and hot weather, from the southern ports and Beijing.  
The essential function of the territory as a summer resort was confirmed. At the same 
time, Chamberlain emphasized the necessity of making Wei-Hai-Wei self-supporting 
from the beginning no matter what the current local economy performed.270 Some 
early reports on the potential of mining in Wei-Hai-Wei to some extent introduced the 
possibilities of an increase in revenue. For instance, Frederic, one of the pioneering 
investigators, believed the feasibility of self-supporting Wei-Hai-Wei through the 
development of gold mining.271 Dorward was also informed by many prospectors who 
had once examined the territory that "the prospects of gold and silver mining are very 
favorable," meanwhile, he also admitted there were moderate chances of finding good 
coal.272 Such remarks made some expectations of a profitable territory, although the 
operation of gold and silver mining finally verified the evaluation of Swettenham who 
doubted the success of mining enterprise at Wei-Hai-Wei in his report to 
Chamberlain.273 
Hitherto, many aspects of this new territory started getting on the right track: the 
supervising authority of the Colonial Office was finally confirmed; the Wei-Hai-Wei 
Order in Council 1901, a guideline of governance of the territory, had already been 
issued; its future function as a summer resort was widely acknowledged; and the aim 
of self-supporting was defined. The subsequent question, therefore, was who would be 
the best choice for this remote dependency. 
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Chapter 4: James Lockhart’s struggle in early days for Wei-Hai-Wei, 1902-1906 
By 1902, the district on the mainland was not administered by the British Government, 
except in the immediate neighborhood of Matou. No land taxes were collected neither 
as there was no system of governance available for carrying out this duty. Although 
some reports indicated an gloomy future of Wei-Hai-Wei when it was handed over to 
the Colonial Office, there were ideas that it might grow quickly, based more or less on 
the example of Hong Kong. 274  The subsequent question the Colonial Office 
confronted was who would be capable to transfer the new acquired territory to a 
prosperous, at least self-supporting possession. 
4.1 Why Lockhart was appointed as the first civil Commissioner at 
Wei-Hai-Wei?  
4.1.1 Qualifications of the future Commissioner in Wei-Hai-Wei 
There were several suggestions given to the Colonial Office in the early days. 
Regarding the future Commissioner in Wei-Hai-Wei, Swettenham in his lengthy report 
analyzed that:  
"The Commissioner, if a military officer, will know nothing of Chinese, and 
probably very little of administration. A junior Consular officer, if he knows 
something of the language and people and even has some experience of 
magisterial work, will have no training as an executive officer accustomed to 
deal with all the manifold questions of administration in an eastern dependency. 
What is really wanted is a knowledgeable, experienced civilian, who 
understands the Chinese people and language and knows his work thoroughly 
and can put the administration of the territory on a sound footing, so that his 
successors will not be embarrassed by his mistakes."275  
Swettenham further suggested an officer with Chinese experience from Hong Kong or 
Malay Statement Governments should be lent to Wei-Hai-Wei with his own salary 
maintained while was provided with a small allowance. Swettenham was confident 
any officer would welcome the change to such a temperate climate on condition that 
all his travelling expenses were covered. 
Considering the proposal to abolish the appointment of Assistant Commissioner who 
was in sole charge of Chinese Affairs on the mainland, G.T. Hare, acting such position 
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at Wei-Hai-Wei, emphasized the importance of the knowledge regarding Northern 
Chinese for a future Commissioner. He believed, without knowledge of that, it would 
be impossible for the Commissioner to satisfactorily execute his responsibilities, 
which lies almost with the Chinese. Hare concerned about the vague possibilities of a 
qualified Commissioner from the British Eastern colonies of which the civil servants 
all learned Southern Chinese, which was little or no service in the North.276 
Commander Gaunt, acting as the first Commissioner in Wei-Hai-Wei, was unsatisfied 
with his own young, junior but high paid assistant, and claimed that 
"To keep a check supervision on the proceedings of the magistrate, it's necessary 
for the Commissioner to know Chinese, in which case no assistant would be 
required, or the Commissioner should have under him an Englishman, who 
would watch the proceedings of the Chinese Magistrate, and also check official 
Chinese letters, proclamations, and written documents for the 
Commissioner."277  
Besides, he proposed the independency of island which should probably be 
administered by a senior naval or military officer, who should act as a magistrate and 
was subject to the Commissioner, so that the Commissioner then can focus on the 
administration of the mainland. 
Joseph Chamberlain, secretary of the State for the Colonial Office, rejected the above 
proposal of a separate island officer by quoting the statement of Admiralty, which 
indicated that the naval interests there were "sufficiently represented by the naval 
officer who is now in charge of the naval establishments on the island and of the 
man-of-war anchorage, for which he is directly responsible to the Naval 
Commander-in-Chief."278 Besides that, Chamberlain believed it was unnecessary and 
not of immediate urgency to appoint an assistant in the dependency so far. This 
seemed understandable because "British colonial methods do not, as a rule, tolerate a 
lavish expenditure on salaries or needless multiplication of official posts."279 
According to The Wei-Hai-Wei Order in Council 1901, the Commissioner is the head 
of the local government, who has the power to proclaim Ordinance, supervise the High 
Court and overlook the administration within the territory in the name of British King 
                                                          
276CO882/6/7, Letter No. 96. P77. 
277CO882/6/7, Letter No. 29, Memoranda by Commander Gaunt. July 25, 1901. P19. 
278CO882/6/7, Letter No. 34, Mr. Chamberlain to Commissioner Sir. F. Dorward. P 22. 
279Johnston, Lion and Dragon in Northern China, 1986, P95. 
57 
and on his behalf. 280  Generally speaking, actual powers of Wei-Hai-Wei 
Commissioner, though exercised in a more limited sphere, are greater than those of 
most Crown-colony Governors (such as Governors of Hong Kong, the Straits 
Settlements, Ceylon and Jamaica), for he is not controlled by a Council.281 The more 
power he has, in some extent equalizes the more onerous responsibilities the 
Commissioner should take.  
To sum up those suggestions and requirements of a qualified Commissioner, he should 
have experience on magisterial work, and be familiar with Chinese language and stuffs 
so that he can manage most workload himself. Taking into those factors accounts, the 
Colonial Office preferred Swettenham's suggestion to "lend" an officer with Chinese 
experience from Hong Kong or Malay Statement Governments. James Stewart 
Lockhart, Colonial Secretary in Hong Kong who was in charge of the administration 
of the New Territories, appeared to be an appropriate candidate in the view of the 
Colonial Office. 
4.1.2 Lockhart’s administrative experience in Hong Kong  
As a native of Argyllshire in Scotland, Lockhart had been an outstanding student at the 
University of Edinburgh and then in 1878, following a competitive examination, was 
appointed as a cadet in the Hong Kong Civil Service in 1878 following a competitive 
examination.282 As a Hong Kong cadet, he was required to first spend time in London 
to acquaint himself with the work of the Colonial Office and start learning Chinese. 
Upon his arriving at Hong Kong in late 1879, Lockhart was sent to Guangzhou to 
continue his study of Chinese and to learn Cantonese, the dialect language used in the 
Guangdong province and the colony. After three years of intensive study and having 
passed a series of rigorous exams, he returned back to Hong Kong and first held the 
post of Clerk of Councils and Chief Clerk in the Colonial Secretary's Office. Since 
then he rose quickly through a number of positions to become both registrar-general 
and colonial secretary in 1895. 
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The work in Registrar General's office provides him "many opportunities of 
investigating all kinds of cases arising amongst the Chinese and …the means of 
obtaining considerable practice in the methods of enquiry which a Magistrate in this 
colony must adopt."283 While the post of Assistant Colonial Secretary, the position he 
took prior to his promotion as Colonial Secretary, was once described as "the seed plot 
of future governors", a fact which the ambitious young Scot must have held firmly in 
his mind.284  During his time in the government of Hong Kong, Lockhart had involved 
himself in establishing better relations between the British and Chinese residents 
especially those of local elites. He stinted no effort to support any organizations which 
can consolidate local Chinese power in Hong Kong. He had particularly close 
involvement with Chinese institutions, familiar to Hong Kong residents even today, 
such as the Tung Wah Hospital, the Po Leung Kuk and District Watchmen force. 
Shino Airlie refers Lockhart as "protector of Chinese" in her Thistle and Bamboo: The 
Life and Times of Sir James Lockhart, a carefully documented biography of Lockhart. 
As his dual positions of Registrar General and Colonial Secretary, by the eve of the 
leasing of the New Territories, it was undisputed that Lockhart had risen to "the 
summit of the Government service" in Hong Kong.285 
As a preparation for taking over control of the New Territories, which was leased to 
Great Britain on June 9, 1898, Lockhart was informed of a specific task from Chas 
Prestwood Lucas, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office, who was heavily 
involved in the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei and New Territories and had maintained a 
close contact with Lockhart during his career in China. The task was that Chamberlain 
desired Lockhart to visit and write a report surveying the territory's socio-economic 
conditions by the Colonial Office, most similar to what Swettenham was asked to do at 
Wei-Hai-Wei. A particular instruction Lockhart received was to ascertain "by what 
means revenue can in the first instance be best raised from the new territory, without 
exciting the suspicions or irritating the feelings and prejudices of the Chinese 
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inhabitants."286 Chamberlain opined that Stewart Lockhart "will be the best judge of 
what is necessary" in New Territories.287 
After three months' on-the-spot investigation, Lockhart finally submitted a thirty-one 
pages report in October 1898. The report was a comprehensive survey on 
socio-economic conditions on the territory, which was complete in every detail and 
included his proposals for the future government. 288  He recommended that "the 
existing organization at present in existence should be as far as possible utilized… the 
head of the Administration should be a commissioner, subordinate to the Governor of 
Hong Kong, but in all other respects independent." 289  In other words, Lockhart 
preferred a Commissioner who can in sole charge of the territory. However, 
concerning the extra cost for such post and a political consideration to incorporate 
New Territories into Hong Kong as close as possible, the Colonial Office disapproved 
Lockhart's suggestions of a Commissioner but appointed him to take in charge of the 
administration as a special responsibility of Colonial Secretary.290On the other hand, 
his proposals to maintain the existing systems of village life whenever practical were 
sanctioned by London. Owing to his appointment in the territory, Lockhart was thus to 
abandon his role as Registrar General.  
It was Lockhart who was responsible for demarcating the boundaries of the new 
acquired territory, and who suppressed the disturbances of 1899 by force, although his 
"hard line" stance was not in accordance with the Governor of Hong Kong, Henry 
Blake, whose views on the insurgency was "pacification" with small military and 
casualties involved.291 When the disturbance finally quelled in May, Lockhart started 
his work as Special Commissioner for the area, a post he held until he left Hong Kong 
three years later. With several months of feverish activity and flurry ordinances, 
Lockhart quickly established the civil administration in the territory. Owing to his 
wisdom and good cooperation with local influential peoples, by 1901 the 
administration was running smoothly and the governance settled in this territory. 
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Lockhart once again returned to Hong Kong Island to discharge his duties as Colonial 
Secretary, a post he had held for six years. 
With twenty-year experiences through successive posts in Hong Kong, Stewart 
Lockhart had equipped a remarkable capacity of administrative work, and an 
outstanding knowledge of Chinese languages and Chinese culture. For instance, in 
addition to being fluency in Cantonese, he had also mastered the Mandarin dialect over 
the years. It was a high time for the competitive Scot himself to seek for some new 
challenges.292 
4.1.3 Lockhart’s appointment in Wei-Hai-Wei 
While the civil administration in New Territories was set up, very little work had been 
done by interim and frequently transferred authorities in Wei-Hai-Wei, which was 
obtained in the same year as New Territories and on very similar terms. In January 
1902, at an interdepartmental conference of the Colonial Office, the War office and 
Admiralty, it was decided the latter bureaus would not retain the naval base and 
military possessions at Wei-Hai-Wei. The authority of the territory thus was 
undertaken by the Colonial Office in total. It was an urgent task to have a qualified 
Commissioner to set up the civil administration of Wei-Hai-Wei. In late 1901, Stewart 
Lockhart was considered to be the man to conduct such task. 
In the first place, Lockhart had years of administration experiences and was fluent in 
Chinese languages, which can meet the fundamental requirements discussed by the 
abovementioned advisors and the Colonial Office. In the second place, his experience 
in the New Territories made him superbly appropriate for a Commissioner at 
Wei-Hai-Wei, which was equivalent in size and poverty to New Territories. 
Recognizing the difficulty of finding an officer possessing of the requisite 
qualifications for the post, Chamberlain reasoned a raise of Lockhart's salary.293The 
last but not the least, it should be noted that the Colonial Office presumed that he might 
"be very useful in connection [Hong Kong] with Weihaiwei."294 London hoped that 
Lockhart would be able to persuade some of his Chinese contacts in the Hong Kong 
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business cycle to invest at the north leased territory, thus bringing increase of revenue 
there, at least making it a self-supporting dependency of Great Britain.295 
In January 1902, Lockhart was informed that his appointment as the first civil 
Commissioner of Wei-Hai-Wei was confirmed,296 and that his duties in Hong Kong 
would cease on 22 April that year. His departure appeared a genuine sad amongst 
many people in Hong Kong so that Lockhart was occupied by farewell dinners and 
presentation of gifts in most time of April. Some senior members of Chinese 
community addressed that Lockhart as "a good friend who had completely won their 
respect and confidence".297 However, it could be safe to presume that Lockhart should 
be delighted to face with a new challenge in north of China. In particular, it was a 
considerable raise regarding his current salary in Hong Kong, increasing from ￡1350 
per year to ￡1500 with an entertainment allowance of ￡200 and an allowance of ￡
150 a year.298 More importantly, so far little administration made Wei-Hai-Wei still a 
clean slate on which Lockhart can establish his proposed administration. His desire to 
retain existing modes of life and social habits in New Territories can manifest again in 
his administration of Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Occupying the top post in the territory, which only at periphery of Whitehall's gaze, 
gave Lockhart a freer hand and greater opportunity in making decisions on how best to 
arrange affairs in accordance with his own beliefs.299 Taking the limited staff at 
Wei-Hai-Wei into account, the main responsibility for administering the territory 
remained with the Commissioner. the Colonial Office straightforwardly stated that 
Commissioner at Wei-Hai-Wei "will be regarded as on the footing of an ordinary 
Colonial Governor".300 As Johnston wrote: "In certain respects he [Commissioner] 
was rather more of an autocrat than a Colonial Governor, for legislative powers were 
vested in himself alone (Subject of course to disallowance by the King) and not, as in 
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most colonies, shared with a legislative Council."301 As it turned out that Lockhart 
took the office from 1902 until his retirement in 1921, a period which lasted nearly 
two-third of the whole leasehold with thirty two years in all. 
Admitting the post is very important, not everyone, however, favored the attractions of 
Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner. In one memorandum sent to C.P. Lucas, an observer 
stated  
"I do not think we should find that officers would be at all satisfied without 
pensions; and the reason suggested-the temporary nature of our occupation of 
Wei Hai Wei-, even if it is sound, is rather an argument for pensions than one 
against, since the officers, on this theory, are liable to be suddenly thrown out of 
employment."302  
The uncertain tenure of Wei-Hai-Wei seems not only to cause detriment to those who 
would take positions there, but also to negative the chances of commercial 
development. The tenure of this territory was actually one of primary focuses in the 
annual reports of the Commissioner in the following years. 
4.2 Lockhart’s struggle for Wei-Hai-Wei 
As the first Commissioner in Wei-Hai-Wei, Lockhart tried many measures to facilitate 
the revenue increases in this business primitive leased territory. Making use of the 
indigenous village system, improving local road situations and adopting a series of 
policies to encourage local economy, Lockhart indeed in its early years promoted 
Wei-Hai-Wei’s development in different aspects. 
4.2.1 Utilizing "village headmen" system 
Long before British leased this territory, Weihaiwei's "village headmen" (Cundong 村
董) comprised the regime base in the territory of which over ninety-five percent of the 
population had been living in villages.303In fact, "village headmen", like "elders" in 
New Territories, were mainly those with good reputations as well as large wealth, and 
were responsible for guaranteeing the good conduct of their fellow villagers. Lockhart 
drew on his experience in the New Territories, but with the difference that in 
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Weihaiwei, he was able to formulate and supervise the first British civil administration 
in the territory in a short time. 
Lockhart's restless and competitive spirits were shown once he arrived at 
Wei-Hai-Wei. On the fifth day after he assumed office, Lockhart convened all the 
village headmen within the territory in order to register them and "confirm" their 
powers by issuing official certificates of appointment, acknowledging their leadership 
within their villages. 304  The class of "great surnames" and headmen themselves 
supported this authorization because their social status and public functions were 
enhanced officially without any damage. The mass of villagers also favored the British 
policy, which allowed their traditional life pattern to continue. Lockhart revealed his 
satisfaction on achieving the cooperation with the headmen in 1902: "There have been 
instances in which headmen have not evinced too great an eagerness to cooperate with 
the authorities, but on the whole the result of the working of the system has justified 
the favorable anticipation I formed regarding it."305 
Prior to his arrival, this territory was so poorly equipped that Lockhart was instructed 
to bring a list of supplementary office supplies which included a typewriter to replace 
the one which the authority "loaned occasionally."306 In the annual report, one can tell 
his satisfaction on achievements at Wei-Hai-Wei that "the year 1902 may be said to 
have been marked by improvements in every direction." A Court was provided, 
telephonic communication between Liu-gong Island and mainland was established, 
various ordinances were introduced and the relations between the Government and the 
people "had become more and more friendly."307 
Once the administrative structure started working smoothly by taking advantage of 
pre-existing social systems, Lockhart turned to the question on how to raise revenues, 
at most developed this territory to be prosperous. Even one of Lockhart's distant 
friends in Selangor had noticed that the government "expected to obtain large revenue 
from the place under your able administration."308 
4.2.2 Revenue rise: taxes collections 
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As a territory with predominant rural population, land tax must have been the major 
resource for local revenue. The land tax at Wei-Hai-Wei was based on the land 
registers handed over by the Wen Deng and Rong cheng magistrates when it was 
leased. Many of old registers were not verified for decades, which made the references 
often inaccurate. The British colonial administrator, however, had to rely on them as a 
result of notable to afford to a cadastral survey of the whole territory with a limited 
funding for administration. 309  Accordingly, the relations between land under 
cultivation and the land subject to taxation were "extremely indefinite."310 According 
to Hart's report, the district on the mainland was not administered by the British 
government, except in the immediate neighborhood of Matou, and no land taxes were 
collected as there was no civil officer then available for carrying out this duty before 
1900.311The land collection in 1900 amounted to $ 5,840 and in 1901 to $6480.312The 
dilemma Lockhart faced was that he had to raise some forms of tax, whereas there 
were no resources for the Commissioner to compile a register which would ensure an 
equitable levy in the territory. 
In late 19th century, land taxes, although were assessed in silver, were paid primarily in 
copper cash, combined with silver tael, Mexican dollar and small silver coin.313 For 
the purpose of land taxation, Shandong government fixed the value of the silver tael in 
copper cash at a rate rather than the market rate. In 1900, Shandong government raised 
the cash value of the silver tael from 2,400 cash to one tael to 4,800 cash for purpose of 
levying the land tax. The British government failed to discover the change until 
Lockhart took his office. Lockhart decided that the land taxes should be collected in 
accordance with Chinese custom in 1902.314 Finally, the British government under 
Lockhart's control by "a stroke of the pen doubled the land-tax," that is, it took twice as 
much from each village as it had did in 1901.315 It should be remembered that the 
average tax at Wei-Hai-Wei paid was six cents per Mu (Mu equals 1/6 acre) which 
appeared exceedingly light when compared to more favored parts of China where the 
tax had averaged from 15 to 30 cents a Mu, and to some Southern provinces where the 
                                                          
309Johnston, Lion and Dragon, P96. Also CO 521/4, Lockhart “Annual Report for 1902.”  
310Ibid, P96. 
311CO 882/6/7, Mr. M. G. Hare ‘Administration Report, Weihaiwei, 1898-1902.’ P77. 
312 CO 826/6/7, Confidential Print No. 75, Hare, ‘Administrative Report’, P79. 
313 CO 826/6/7, Confidential Print No. 75, Hare, ‘Administrative Report’, P80. 
314CO521/4, Lockhart “Annual Report for 1902.”  
315Johnston, Lion and Dragon, P97. 
65 
tax had been collected twice annually. In the New Territory the land tax levied on the 
poorest land would be 8 cents per Mu. "There is no reason to suppose that the average 
poverty of the whole leased Territory at Wei-Hai-Wei is any greater than the average 
poverty of the poorest land in New Territories."316 As a matter of fact, residents at 
Wei-Hai-Wei undertook much less tax burdens than their neighborhood who had to 
pay salt tax and an increasing amount of land tax requested since 1901 by the Chinese 
government in order to pay the indemnity for the Boxer disturbance. 
Furthermore, it was village headmen who were responsible for the collection of land 
tax. Each village headman was informed annually of the tax amount he was 
responsible for and the total tax was to be apportioned by his fellow villagers 
themselves. When payment was due, the headman brought it to the government office 
where he received the receipts for all the land taxes paid by each individual family in 
the village. Thus a considerable tax rising cost was virtually nothing to administer or 
collect for the British government.317 Taking advantages of headman also got the 
residents out of paying the commissions and fees formerly given to the agents of the 
Chinese magistrates who collected the taxes.318 By levying a comparatively less 
amounts, eliminating additional burdensome charges of the former tax clerks, 
improving methods of land tax collection, it was possible to see that little difficulty 
was ever encountered for the colonial government at Wei-Hai-Wei in raising the land 
tax doubled in 1902.319The land tax in 1901 amounted to $ 6,480, whilst a sum of 
$14,300 was collected in 1902.  
In addition to the land tax, the British collected a variety of other fees such as licenses 
for laundries, house tax, fines of court, rents from colonial land and houses (most 
located on the Liu-gong Island), junk and wharfage dues (the total of which increased 
significantly as trade expanded), monopolies for sales of wine, spirit, opium, the 
government abattoir and etc..320Those items had already been collected since 1900 but 
none was well implemented because the administration at that time was hardly beyond 
Liu-gong Island and the immediate of Matou.321Under the control of the competent 
                                                          
316CO521/4, Lockhart “Annual Report for 1902.”  
317Johnston, Lion and Dragon, P97. 
318 CO 826/6/7, Confidential Print No. 75, Hare, ‘Administrative Report’, P79.  
319CO521/4, Lockhart “Annual Report for 1902.” 
320CO521/4, Lockhart “Annual Report for 1902.”  
321Johnston, Lion and Dragon, P79. 
66 
Acting Assistant Commissioner Mr. G. T. Hare, most of those fees started to be levied 
at Wei-Hai-Wei. Take the monopolies for example, those of wine and opium 
contributed $1200 and $2350 separately in 1901.322 Lockhart further extended these 
monopolies to the Liu-gong Island so that opium and wine monopolies brought a raise 
$550 and $250 respectively in 1902. Two years later, he decided to solicit new and 
higher offers from as far afield as Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements and by 1905 
Lockhart had collected a bid of $ 5,600 for the annual license of opium.323When the 
government abattoir opened early in 1902 at Matou, $750 for the monopoly of 
slaughtering sheep and cattle in the territory was paid to the government. The tenants 
even offered $1,500 for a continuation of such monopoly for the next year. 
One should bear in mind that all the increase of revenue was achieved by Lockhart 
with the aid of who can be described as a tiny staff. Prior to 1906 they included a 
secretary to the government who also served as magistrate, an assistant magistrate, a 
financial assistant who was also in charge of public works, two medical officers, three 
police inspectors and their assistants, and a small group of native police force.324 
Lockhart's former fellow colleagues, Hare predicted that "any attempt to increase the 
land tax or impose any other extra burden on the villagers would meet with very strong 
opposition" and the abject poverty made the people hardly pay more, in his report of 
April 1902 within one month prior to Lockhart's arrival.325 Nevertheless, one must 
notice Lockhart's prudence and competence in raising revenues when looking at the 
following  form-Government figures for Wei-Hai-Wei from 1901 to 1911. 
Table 1 Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1901-11326 
Year Revenue ($) Expenditure ($) Grant-in-aid(￡) 
1901-02 22,220 121,187 11,250 
1902-03 35,456 102,044 12,000 
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1903-04 58,586 165,873 9,000 
1904-05 90,355 162,282 6,000 
1905-06 105,934 146,120 3,000 
1906-07 76,777 160,899 4,500 
1907-08 80,331 173,340 10,000 
1908-09 83,277 168,740 10,000 
1909-10 93,499 145,687 4,400 
1910-11 75,353 145,028 4,400 
Remarks: ￡1=$10 in 1900.327 ￡1=$9.22 in 1906328 
The two chief events affecting the finances had been the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 
which led to a considerable export of cattle from Shantung through Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Meanwhile, the Commissioner charged ‘Inspection Fees' and, with the resulting 
shipping dues, netted a considerable amount. The result saw the high revenue for 
1904-1905 and 1905-1906.329 Likewise, there was a decline in revenue in 1906-1907 
when the war was over and Britain's uncertainty over the territory deprived of courage 
and confidence for investors for a time.330 
Definitely the significance of the grant-in-aid in maintaining financial balance at 
Wei-Hai-Wei should not be ignored. As one can tell from table 1, without the subsidy, 
deficit of this fledging territory should be very high, and perhaps Wei-Hai-Wei's 
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taxpayers would not have experienced a comparatively lower burden under the British 
government. Still the figures show that the revenue was steadily going up and the 
grant-in-aid was steadily coming down. In a period from 1901 to 1906, the grant-in-aid 
had been reduced by fifty percent. Of course, considerable credit should be given to 
the administrators themselves. By virtue of improving the system of land tax and 
formulating certain new sources of revenue, the colonial government was able to 
administer the territory with less reliance on London's financial support. 
4.2.3 Lockhart's efforts for commercial facilities 
Although the British at the beginning had the intention to maintain Wei-Hai-Wei as a 
naval base and made a clear pledge to Germany that they did not interest in making the 
territory a contest of the latter in commercial and military, it was soon welcomed by 
the Colonial Office that any economic developments without large government 
expenditure and might lessen the burden of Imperial Financial on administrative 
costs. 331  As an experienced senior the Colonial officer, Lockhart, with high 
expectations of London, was confident to bring commerce into Wei-Hai-Wei, 
especially considering his excellent contacts with the Chinese merchants of Hong 
Kong, who would invest their capital in the north territory. 
In one comment of Times of February 1902, it also held an optimistic view upon the 
future of Wei-Hai-Wei, the writer wrote: in the hands of an able and experienced 
officials as Lockhart, Wei-Hai-Wei would be a useful and valuable possession, "it will 
unquestionably be of considerable value, and it is by no means improbable that it will 
someday fulfill for the commerce of Northern China the functions which Hong Kong 
has long fulfilled for the commerce of Southern China as an important distributing 
centre."332 Like Wei-Hai-Wei, Hong Kong was regarded for many years after its 
acquisition as an "absolutely useless burden," but became one of the greatest 
commercial harbors of the world decades later.333 
With those confidences in mind, Lockhart committed himself into a series of public 
works that would facilitate commerce of Wei-Hai-Wei. 
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Wei-Hai-Wei still maintained a very primitive transportation network at that time, 
which of course to a very large extent hampered all kinds of development in this 
territory. Given the significance of transportation, the road construction, as one of 
major expenditures among chief public works, was given a high priority by War 
Department since the beginning of its leasehold. From the year of 1899 to 1901, 
twenty-three miles of road in total were constructed, of which eighteen miles were at 
Liu-gong Island.334 Lockhart also attached importance to road-building straightaway; 
seventeen miles of roads were built in his first ten months of office.335 The expenditure 
of road construction in 1903-1904 was $74,734.34 as compared with $50,676.93 in 
1901-1902 and $ 55,286.12 in 1902-1903.336 All the roads on the Island and main road 
of the mainland had been put in good order by 1903.337  One traveler who passed by 
Wei-Hai-Wei in 1906 described the new roads "are most excellent going, as smooth as 
a billiard table, with not a single run or loose stone to be found on it…The last seven 
miles (of the road) were even marked by mile-stone."338 
Like those foreign travelers who approached this leasehold, the improvement in the 
road system was highly appreciated by local villagers. Good roads, however, stopped 
at the boundary of the territory. Some of the inhabitants of Wei-Hai-Wei thus 
addressed a petition to the Commissioner, urging that the Chinese authorities should 
be requested to an extension of such roads to the neighboring district-cities of Jung 
Cheng, Wen-teng and Ning hai.339 Although the Governor of Shandong disposed to 
favor the proposal and Lockhart understood there could be some delay of the project as 
a result of insufficient funds.340Johnston, the magister at Wei-Hai-Wei, suspected that 
the Shandong government was not willing to aid the commercial facilities like good 
road-connection of Wei-Hai-Wei, which would result in more goods exported through 
duty-free Wei-Hai-Wei rather than Chinese own port at Chefoo.341 
As a matter of fact, the rapid development of road construction within the territory was 
never sustained in the later years. The whole length of new roads at Wei-Hai-Wei 
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constructed by the British government was merely fifty miles within its thirty-two 
years leasehold in total,342 which means that over eighty percent of the road-building 
was carried out by the first five years of the leasehold."No public works were 
undertaken during the year" was the repeated statement in Lockhart's annual report 
since 1906.343 
Likewise, a railway connecting Wei-Hai-Wei and Shandong province was an 
impossible dream because Britain originally pledged to Germany not to construct any 
railroad to link the territory with the province's hinterland. It feels requisite to repeat 
the assurance which has already mentioned in the above chapter. As for the railway 
construction in Shandong, the British government stated as following: 
"It is specially understood that England will not construct any railroad 
communication from Wei-Hai-Wei and the district leased therewith into the 
interior of the province."344 
When Lockhart assumed office at Wei-Hai-Wei, bringing some commercial hope 
there, businessman expected him to break the deadlock of no railway in the leased 
territory. On 14 May 1902, a petition was dispatched to the Commissioner by a local 
company, known as Messrs. Lavers and Clark, which was also the first and largest 
foreign capital at Wei-Hai-Wei, urged the construction of a railway to contact 
Chefoo.345 Although noticed the pledge made to Germany, Lockhart attempted to 
persuade the home country to grant such application on the base that the pledge only 
referred to "railway communication with the interior of the province" rather than a line 
of tramways to Chefoo or into the interior of Shandong.346 He tried to convince the 
London superintendent that Wei-Hai-Wei would become the chief center of commerce 
in the North of China, with a railway communication, thus it can be served as an 
effective check on Russian influence in the North as well as an eminent political and 
commercial port for the British.347The feedback from London was that it would be 
feasible for a construction of railway within the limits of the leased territory, whereas a 
railway to Chefoo would be permitted only if there is no opposition from Germany and 
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a concession from Chinese authorities.348To Lockhart's disappointed, Germany had 
already obtained that concession and was not going to let Wei-Hai-Wei flourish by 
means of rail at the expense of Jiaozhou,349 especially when a railway, which was 
supposed to connect Jiaozhou and Jinan, had already been under-construction since 
1899. Just like the case of the application of road-building linking the territory, the 
railway plan at Wei-Hai-Wei will never be realized under the British flag. The 
Commissioner, although powerless upon the railway, continued to pay attention to 
other opportunities to stimulate the commercial development in his territory. 
Prior to Lockhart's arrival at Wei-Hai-Wei, the only reliable communication with the 
outside world was some small steamers which run back and force between 
Wei-Hai-Wei and Chefoo. People who visited the territory had to approach it by way 
of Chefoo as there was no regular direct steamer to this port. Such roundabout mode of 
reaching Wei-Hai-Wei, Lockhart remarked it as "obvious unsatisfactory in the 
extreme," had prevented visitors to come.350 Lockhart soon introduced a contract of a 
regular steamer between Shanghai and Wei-Hai-Wei, later linked with Tianjin, which 
meant reliable mail, passengers and freight for the dependency.351 The numbers of 
steamer calling at Wei-Hai-Wei rose from 146 in 1902 to 343 in 1903, and the number 
was up to 567 in 1909. Accordingly, the tons of freight entering Wei-Hai-Wei 
increased from 151,809 in 1902 to 244,930 in 1903; the figure had risen to 481,291 in 
1909.352 That brought an increase in the export of local products, such as salt fish and 
ground nuts, and a rise in the import of items such as sugar, dyes and cotton yarn and 
so on.  
Indeed, the improvement in roads and steamer service contributed largely to the 
economic growth at this territory. If one looks at the following government figures for 
the major exports and imports of Wei-Hai-Wei from 1902 to 1905, it is possible to see 
how the leasehold trade quickly exceeded early dismal expectations. 
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Table 2 Major Exports and Imports at Wei-Hai-Wei, 1902-1905353   (piculs) 
 Exports Imports 
Year Ground-nut Ground-nut 
Seeds354 
Fish Sugar Cotton-yarn 
1902 918 475 10.5 4,125 1,570 
1903 10,847 2,799 1,392 4,243 2,133 
1904 9832 2,877 1,437 13,199 4,327 
1905 5219 13,505 No Records 14,726 7,597 
The fluctuations of the above exports were influenced from year to year by weather 
condition and international market,355 but it is still visible that there was a stable rise in 
the economics at the leasehold. In his annual report, Lockhart manifested his delight at 
the rapid growing of the ground nuts, the territory's largest export product, which had 
proved "very profitable". 356  The increase in trade was undoubtedly due to the 
Wei-Hai-Wei's foreign-port status, advantages of which will be discussed later, 
combined with the commercial facilities afforded by the Colonial Office under the 
regime of the Commissioner. 
At the same time, the improvement upon the transportation, both well-built roads and 
expansion of shipping, at Wei-Hai-Wei after 1898 benefited local economics in other 
ways. Owing to a well-reputed climate condition combined with the convenience of 
transaction to the territory, the territory would welcome a large number of visitors 
from foreign communities throughout China from May to September each year. In 
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June of 1902, for example, twelve naval vessels on the China station visited 
Wei-Hai-Wei, which had stimulated a considerable amount of business.357 As a matter 
of fact, apart from the British, fleets of other countries, although fluctuated in quantity 
year to year, regularly called the territory during the summer months, A variety of 
industries involved in tourism started booming such as entertainment facilities, hotels, 
handicraft manufacturing, thermal spring business.358 With the increase of tourists, 
over thirty hotels were established at Wei-Hai-Wei. The biggest one was King's Hotel, 
which was equipped with eighty guest rooms, pool room, and tennis court.359 Another 
example is one craft shop at Matou employed over thirty people to run the 
business. 360 No exact data of tourism had brought in sum at Wei-Hai-Wei. The 
prosperity of restaurants and other related businesses can indicate, at least, that local 
economy should have been improved. 
In his annual report for 1902, Lockhart held a cheerful prospect of the commercial 
future at Wei-Hai-Wei in the view of a better established administration and more 
encouragement given to trade. When it came to the dismal critics of Wei-Hai-Wei, 
Lockhart opined:  
"In the early history of every place there is always much that tend to discourage 
and to depress and there are invariably those who seem to take a delight in 
dwelling on the dark rather than the bright side of things and in refusing to see 
good or hope in anything."361 
At that time, Lockhart managed this territory with full of enthusiasm and was 
confident that he would be able to turn it to a thriving dependency.  
4.2.4 Wei-Hai-Wei Golden Mining Company 
From the beginning of the leasehold, the territory had been visited by mining engineers 
who prospected for minerals. Hitherto 1902, no steps had been taken to work on any 
minerals yet. Lockhart spared no delay of his support on any promising commercial 
prospects. He thus granted several prospecting licenses and gave his assistance to a 
firm known as the Wei-Hai-Wei Golden Mining Company, which was floated with a 
capital of $600,000 in Shanghai market by 1902. As situated in Tiger Hill on the 
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boundary between Shandong province and Wei-Hai-Wei, the working had to be 
carried on in both territories. Lockhart lost no time to put forward a proposal to the 
Governor of Shandong to cooperate on the run of the company and suggested the profit 
should be divided equally between colonial government and that of China.362 After 
inspected the Tiger Hill area, Shandong Governor at first agreed upon the proposals of 
Lockhart. However, in 1903, German Minister at Beijing made an opposition to 
Chinese Foreign Office (Wai Wu Bu), which prevented the Shandong Governor from 
adopting the course which he himself as well as Lockhart wished to follow. The 
Germans objected to the opening of the mining because of a China-German 
Agreement that gave German exclusive mining rights within an area of 250 li from 
Chefoo, which almost covered the whole territory of Wei-Hai-Wei and included the 
region of British influence.363 
In his report, Lockhart did not conceal his frustration and powerlessness on the 
privilege of Germany in Shandong province, he wrote: 
"Germany does not evince much gratitude for the undertaking of Great Britain 
not to construct railways in Shantung…Germany is determined, so far as she 
can, to block the way and close the doors in this part of China to any other Power 
that shows any sign of attempting to develop its interest."364 
When receiving Lockhart's message that the mining concession in Shandong province 
had been secretly given to Germany which included the British territory and its sphere 
of influence stipulated in the Convention for the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, the British 
camp was in an uproar over the China-German Agreement. Sir Ernest Satow, the 
British Minister at Beijing 1900-1906, who had visited Wei-Hai-Wei and kept a close 
contact with Lockhart, made a protest to German Ministers and Chinese authorities 
respectively in Beijing.365 Qing government responded that no final terms of the 
concession were signed and Lockhart's proposal of Tiger Hill with the Governor of 
Shandong had been rejected by Qing Court some time ago.366 Satow and the Colonial 
Office, nevertheless, suggested the Commissioner of Wei-Hai-Wei to reopen 
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negotiations with the Governor of Shandong regarding the mining area of Tiger hill.367 
Regarding Germany's concession on mining, ultimately Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner 
learned that instead of the exclusive rights to an unlimited number of sites in 
Shandong, Germany should be restricted to five or six spots, each with a space limit of 
ten square miles.368 Still, this would not change the fact that Germany was to turn 
Shandong into a German province, just as Russia did in Manchuria.369 
Mining prospecting licenses continued to be issued by the British government at 
Wei-Hai-Wei and it seems that the mining would turn out to be a prosperous industry. 
In the close of 1903, the manager of Wei-Hai-Wei Golden Mining Company presented 
to its shareholders that "the company will have a resulting profit of about $ 150,000 for 
a year."370 The board of the company was sanguine in investing more machines.371 
Although in the following years, the mining company established a crushing mill and 
other machinery, and there were over 400 employees working for the company, of 
which nine were foreigners, some difficulties started to arise regarding the 
management of the company.372 As for the working in the mine, one observer reported 
seeing the local miners breaking the ore into small chunks before crushing it in a 
converted bean mill.373 
Despite Lockhart, at the beginning, bore in mind that it should not be too sanguine as 
to results on the mining until gold could have actually been found.374 It must have been 
frustrating news for the Commissioner when he found the operations of the 
Wei-Hai-Wei Gold Mining Company unsatisfactory and it went into liquidation in 
1906.375 The mining project as a result of years of wrangling over the rights and poor 
result, almost before it started, was not supposed to be a promising commercial 
prospect, as the Commissioner expected. 
4.3 Dilemma Lockhart faced to sought investments for Wei-Hai-Wei 
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With the increase of trade, the Commissioner believed that more improvement can be 
made if capital could be attracted to Wei-Hai-Wei. In his report to London, Lockhart 
wrote that "there can be no doubt that as regards to trade there are many possibilities at 
Weihaiwei. What is wanted is capital to convert those possibilities into actualities." 
And he hoped the chief requisite, capital, would be invested in commercial enterprises 
here.376 Commissioner Lockhart was informed before his departure to Hong Kong that 
capitalists would be not likely to come to his territory unless he himself could 
personally interview them and explain to them the trade condition at Wei-Hai-Wei.377 
Thus Lockhart proposed himself a trip to Hong Kong in 1903 to seek for investments 
into the north territory from those commercial communities and persons he had been 
maintaining good relations with since he was in Hong Kong. Although reluctant in the 
first instance, the Colonial Office finally agreed to pay the expenses for his journey but 
cautioned him as follows:  
"You will of course be careful not to involve the Government in any     
responsibility towards persons who may by your representations be led to invest 
capital in Weihaiwei".378 
It was apparent that Lockhart's superiors were pleased to see any investment which 
could bring additional increase into government revenue, but they were not ready to 
take responsibility for the Hong Kong investors at Wei-Hai-Wei in case business 
failures, which might cause compensation. Two years ago, Lockhart left for the north 
leased territory in the knowledge that his Chinese merchants friends in Hong Kong 
were keen to "see what they could make of Wei Hai Wei", despite the new territory 
could not be approach directly at that time.379 Very soon, the Commissioner, however, 
realized how difficult to attract capitals from Hong Kong, even when he paid a 
personal visit there. No one was to invest in Wei-Hai-Wei until certain fundamental 
problems such as the tenure as well as British intension in the territory were solved.380 
The tenure of Wei-Hai-Wei was stipulated in the Convention for the Lease of 
Wei-Hai-Wei, the same as Russia maintained in Port Arthur, which induced 
uncertainty of the leased territory. It was recognized that merchants would not risk 
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their capitals in such area. Before any progress advanced on the tenure, Lockhart had 
to resolve an urgent problem regarding the foreign port status of Wei-Hai-Wei. 
This was raised by the Chinese Customs Authorities at Shanghai, who proposed that 
Wei-Hai-Wei "should not be treated to be treated as foreign port and should not, 
therefore, enjoy the privileges accorded to such a port" in the mid of 1903.381 As a 
foreign port, no duties would be charged on merchandise imported and drawbacks 
would be refunded on foreign and native goods which had paid taxes elsewhere in 
China.382 This definitely had given Wei-Hai-Wei a significant advantage over Chefoo 
and Tsingtao where various types of duties were levied.383 While if Wei-Hai-Wei were 
to be a treaty port, as Chinese authorities suggested, a Custom House would be set up 
and to levy duties just as it did in Chefoo. As we have seen that it was difficult enough 
to attract trade even if no duties were levied at Wei-Hai-Wei, local merchants of 
course objected strongly the action of Chinese Custom as it would seriously interfere 
with their business here.384 
In the letter to his supervisors, Lockhart reiterated that "unless the status of 
Wei-Hai-Wei as a foreign port is maintained, there will be little or no chance of its 
developing into a centre for trade."385 He referred to New Territories as part and parcel 
of Hong Kong and enjoyed the same privileges as the colony and the status of foreign 
port. In the opinion of Lockhart, "it is difficult to see how any differences" between 
Wei-Hai-Wei and New Territories. In order to obviate future doubts regarding the 
status of the territory, Lockhart hoped that Wei-Hai-Wei should be clearly "styled a 
colony" at once and he accentuated one more time that "the trade prospects and 
commercial development of Wei-Hai-Wei have been adversely affected by the feeling 
of uncertainty that exists among the public as to the intensions of the imperial 
government regarding this Dependency."386 The present, therefore, should seem as a 
favorable opportunity for making a definite declaration, which can dispel all 
uncertainty. This was the first time Lockhart proposed to resolve the problem of the 
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uncertainty at the leased territory. 
However, after a short debates, a conclusion was reached at the Colonial Office as 
follows: "the question (treat Wei-Hai-Wei as the same as NT) is by no means as so 
simple as Mr. Lockhart thinks", it was emphasized that "it is undesirable for political 
reasons to accept the view of the Law officers and a distinction has been drawn 
between the Kowloon extension which Mr. Lockhart thinks an exact parallel and 
Wei-Hai-Wei." 387  Obviously, those officials in London were reluctant to have 
themselves re-involved in the question of the nature of the far remote leased territory, 
as they had just settled down during its transfer from the War office and Admiralty. 
Although no decision was made regarding Wei-Hai-Wei as a colony, Lockhart's efforts 
with respect to the status of a foreign port were greatly assisted by Satow, the British 
Minister in Beijing, again. Satow, with assistance of Robert Hart, Inspector General of 
China's Imperial Maritime Custom Service 1863-1911, successfully maintained the 
foreign port status of Wei-Hai-Wei.388It remained to be seen, however, whether the 
leasehold could overcome other shortcomings and what other supports the 
Commissioner could acquire to develop itself prosperous. 
As a literally virgin territory before Lockhart came, the Commissioner indeed had to 
organize everything from mail service to land revenue, from administrative staff to 
education institutions, from scratch. the Colonial Office placed the hope of a revenue 
rising territory on Lockhart, but those policy-makers did not welcome, or even 
annoyed any requirements from the Commissioner which might cause additional 
expense. 
In most cases, it was necessary for Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner to administer the 
territory in a frugality way. The leased territory by 1902 had no medical officer 
available for the medical inspection of anchored vessels, which might have brought 
with contagious disease in the neighborhood ports. Lockhart had to lend a temporary 
medical staff of the naval sick quarters on the Liu-gong Island with the assistance of 
Vice-Admiral.389 After the War office and Admiralty were abandoned to fortify the 
leased territory, Chinese Regiment, the military force at Wei-Hai-Wei, was disbanded 
consequently. To Britain, Chinese Regiment contributed a lot in Boxer movement in 
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Beijing and the demarcation uprising of the beginning of its leasehold. By 1903, the 
military force had been reduced to five hundred, half of its peak, and by 1906 
dismissed altogether. With a population of 150,000 in a 285 square miles area, there 
were only a dozen or so police force at Wei-Hai-Wei, including three European 
inspectors, seven or sometimes six or eight Chinese constables and six detectives. By 
1903, the total annual expenditure of police was hardly ten percent of New Territories, 
which owned the similar population.390 Chamberlain agreed the retention of a civil 
police force at Wei-Hai-Wei, but the establishment should be as low as possible.391 The 
preservation of headman system was, to certain extent, attributed to the consideration 
of saving cost of dotting police station throughout the territory.392 The administrative 
staff of the British government remained no more than twenty in all in almost the 
whole leasehold. In one word, the territory was to run in a way as little cost as possible. 
This lack of funding was apparent in other areas too. Perhaps unaware to Lockhart, the 
Treasury actually suggested a cut on the salary of the post Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner 
before he assumed the office. Considering the military importance to the post 
combined with the civil duties of administration, the Treasury, although with some 
reluctance, finally assented Lockhart should receive a salary and allowance the the 
Colonial Office suggested.393 As we already discussed, in fact in the view of the 
Colonial Office, a high salary for Lockhart was based on the hope he can bring some 
revenue and economies development to Wei-Hai-Wei. In 1907, the question of the 
salary of the Commissioner was again raised. By then, as the administration had been 
established, one minutes of the Colonial Office bespoke that: "it is clear that 
Weihaiwei is not going to boom, there is no reason for continuing to attach such high 
pay to so easy a post (the Commissioner)."394 Despite that, such suggestions of cutting 
down a salary of Lockhart had never been carried out. Lockhart unwittingly caused 
antagonism at the Colonial Office by his continuous desire to spend money on public 
works, to apply for more supports from home country.  
Further, Lockhart lost the protection of Lucas at the Colonial Office, who knew 
Lockhart personally and appreciated his talents, when the latter was prompted to head 
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the Dominions Division in 1907.395 Lockhart suddenly became a less than favored 
figure in London. 
Although not welcomed in London, the Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner had maintained a 
good relation with Chinese authorities in Shandong province since he assumed the 
office. The area of the province is estimated at 65,104 squares miles, being larger by 
7,000 square miles than England and Wales.396 With German's larger threat to Chinese 
sovereignty and the requirements to develop provincial economics, Shandong 
authorities preferred to make peace with the British,397 although the leased territory 
was roughly the size of a tiny sub-district in the province. On the other hand, facing the 
predicament to stimulate local commercial, Lockhart attempted to attract investments 
and other supports within the province which could benefit the economics at 
Wei-Hai-Wei. One observer remarked in 1910 as follows:  
"the relations between the British officials of Weihaiwei and the Chinese officials 
of the neighborhood have always been intimate and friendly: much more intimate, 
indeed, than those normally existing between the Government of Hong Kong and 
the magistrates and prefects of the neighboring regions of Kuangtung."398 
Zhou Fu, the Governor of Shandong Province in 1902-1904, paid a brief personal visit 
in December 1902. Lockhart then felt obliged to reciprocate by visiting Jinan, the 
provincial capital city, in April 1903. As the guest of the governor, Lockhart was 
treated in so lavish hospitality that the Commissioner could never repay in his territory. 
The governor had arranged bodyguards and official recipients along the way to Jinan 
once Lockhart arrived at Chefoo. The days Lockhart spent in Jinan were served with 
excellent banquets and cordiality among Chinese officials. It should be pointed out 
that the Governor Zhou, who was implementing many modern reforms, thought that 
the British could be a useful ally so as to counterpoise to German influence and to 
offset an increasing diversion trade to Jiaozhou. At the same time, it was a good 
opportunity for Lockhart to advocate commercial investments at Wei-Hai-Wei to the 
Jinan Chamber of Commerce and other capitalists.399 
Despite, it turned out that the possibilities that Lockhart and Wei-Hai-Wei can divert 
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German influence in Shandong were likely to be negligible, and very few merchants in 
Jinan preferred to transfer or formulate their businesses at Wei-Hai-Wei. The 
successors of Zhou Fu followed the mutual visits and hospitality to Lockhart. Cordial 
relations between the Chinese provincial officials and the Commissioner continued till 
his retirement in this leased territory. The result was that through the medium of 
informal or semi-official correspondence, and by personal visits. To Wei-Hai-Wei 
Commissioner's satisfaction, the Governor of Shandong in practically never suspected 
the status of a foreign port of Wei-Hai-Wei when the question was raised by the 
Chinese Customs at Shanghai.400Johnston appreciated the good relations that "a great 
deal of business is satisfactorily carried through without "fuss" or waste of time, and 
that frontier-matters which might conceivably grow into difficult international 
questions requiring diplomatic intervention, are quickly and easily settled on the 
spot."401 However, when it came to something significant like Britain's mining rights 
in Tiger Hill and proposal of constructing a railway connecting Wei-Hai-Wei and the 
hinterland, the governor was easily checked by Germany. As Shiona Airlie points out 
that the congenial relations between Jinan and Wei-Hai-Wei had their foundation in 
Lockhart's personal excellent Chinese culture and appropriate manners other than 
political motives.402 
In his first four years of office, Lockhart enthusiastically made every measure to 
stimulate commercial chances and revenue rise. Indeed, from Table 1 and 2, one can 
see that, the income and trade in the territory grew stably annually. In his annual report 
for 1903, Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner still was confident that "there is still much room 
for improvement."403 The shifts in the international situation in the Far East during the 
years 1902 to 1905, however, immediately alarmed the future of the leased territory. 
4.4 A vague future of Wei-Hai-Wei and Lockhart’s failure in developing the 
leased territory 
In January 1902, Anglo-Japanese Alliance was established, which opposed to 
continued Russian expansion without involving the Great Britain in a direct alignment 
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against Russia.404 At the same time, it prepared Japan for a war with Russia to 
scramble for Manchuria.405 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and the consequent 
victory for Japan arouse a new round of conjecture and anxiety of Britain's intension at 
Wei-Hai-Wei. On one hand, as abovementioned in the Wei-Hai-Wei Convention, it 
was leased to the Great Britain as long as Port Arthur remained in the occupation of 
Russia. Technically speaking, British should render Wei-Hai-Wei to China once 
Russia left Port Arthur. On the other hand, if Britain gave up the leased territory, it now 
needs to consult their Japanese allies before final decision was made. 
In fact, Japanese government informed London that it was "the earnest wish" to see the 
Great Britain should remain in Wei-Hai-Wei even in the war time.406 When the war 
ended, the British Minister at Tokyo was, on different occasions, suggested that the 
British should retain at Wei-Hai-Wei by its ally as long as German held Jiaozhou.407 It 
was clear that British withdraw from Wei-Hai-Wei would be in opposition to wishes of 
Japanese Government, and would create some negative impression throughout 
Japan.408 
In Whitehall, the status of Wei-Hai-Wei was one of the major concerns since the 
Russo-Japanese War. Considering that limited grant-in-aid had cost and little facilities 
had been constructed, especially there was no manufacturing industry and little 
indication of prosperous, it was thought as an ideal time to return the leased territory to 
China.409 Those who championed retention believed that abandoning the territory 
would not only detriment Britain's prestige in China but also "leave Germany in 
possession of the field in North China".410 Lansdowne did not admit that Russia's 
evacuation of Port Arthur would automatically terminate Britain's tenure of 
Wei-Hai-Wei.411Decision-making maintained slow,412 however, finally the British War 
Office, the Colonial Office, and the Admiralty all agreed that Wei-Hai-Wei should be 
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retained for its usefulness as a "flying base" and as a check upon further German 
encroachment in Shandong.413 It was summed up the views of the policy-makers upon 
Wei-Hai-Wei that "Its possession may be of service, and its retention involves no 
charge on army funds."414 When Chinese minister in London formally raised the 
rendition of Wei-Hai-Wei, the British government replied "it would be exceedingly 
inconvenient to withdraw" from Wei-Hai-Wei, although it should eventually be 
restored to China.415 However, the Foreign Office resisted Chinese attempts to lay 
down a timetable of retrocession. 416  With the assurance that Chinese navy can 
continue to utilize Wei-Hai-Wei for training fleets, Chinese government, in the end, 
acquiesced Britain's retention at Wei-Hai-Wei. Thus, by early January 1907, the matter 
was closed.417 
While London, Tokyo and Beijing exchanged opinions on the status of Wei-Hai-Wei, 
capitalists at the territory waited for the decision in anxiety. In April, a Shanghai 
company raised the question of the uncertain tenure of Wei-Hai-Wei which would 
endanger their investments at this leased territory as a result of an impending 
probability of Russia's evacuation from the Liaodong peninsula.418 The feeling of 
uncertainty prevailed at Wei-Hai-Wei when Japan took over Russia at Port Arthur and 
Manchuria at the close of Russo-Japanese War. The local economics was seriously 
hampered: the trade maintained paralyzed and all businesses were practically at a 
standstill, several large transfers of property which under ordinary circumstances 
would have taken place had to be indefinitely postponed.419 Merchants both the 
European and Chinese at Wei-Hai-Wei made a joint petition to the government of 
Lockhart, requesting to define the intention and the tenure of this territory from the 
Colonial Office; otherwise they had to transfer their interest to other places. 420 
Lockhart passed on their concerns but the only response from London was that still no 
definition was made at Wei-Hai-Wei.421 Rumors continued to be rife regarding the 
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retrocession of this territory to China. At one time, the European and Chinese press 
were discussing the matter. Such statements had been published so widely and so 
regularly that the public found it difficult to doubt the rendition of Wei-Hai-Wei.422 
From 1904 to 1906, Lockhart recommended to his home country to secure the 
retention of Wei-Hai-Wei on several occasions. In his report to the Colonial Office, 
Lockhart reiterated that unless the tenure of Wei-Hai-Wei could be made more 
permanent, it was not likely to induce any capitalists to invest here,423 and "little hope 
of commercial development here" until the feeling of uncertainty would have been 
removed.424 In the end of 1906, the decision came to the Commissioner that the British 
would retain in the territory yet without any assurance of the tenure. 
It should be noticed that, although London policy-makers determined to maintain the 
leased territory, no one proposed future development of Wei-Hai-Wei. On the contrary, 
Sir Edward Grey, the new Foreign Secretary 1905-1916, gave his opinion that "in 
views of the uncertain tenure for the future, it should be inadvisable for the British 
Government to embark on any expenditure in connection with the place."425 Such 
policy can induce nothing but a continued languish to the just awaken commercials in 
this territory. Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner had to admit that "it is the desire of His 
Majesty's Government that no effort should be spared to make this port a commercial 
centre." 426  By the end of 1906, the situation of the leased territory plunged 
Commissioner into the depths of hopelessness. 
Lockhart did not shift the situation of Wei-Hai-Wei from the root. But the territory did 
improve a lot under his superintendence. Lockhart's predecessor, Hare recorded in 
early 1902 as follows: "There are two British merchants in the island but the business 
is almost entirely a commission and banking one, and they export nothing. There is no 
European merchant on the mainland."427 It turned out that the development of tourism 
and trade had attracted over one dozen of foreign capitalists both in Liu-gong Island 
and the mainland. By 1906, the approximate figures the western merchants had 
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invested were around $ 616,730,428 which were equal to the total amount of the 
revenue collected from 1901 to 1909 at the territory.  
It was said in Hare's report that  
"it is in vain to look for the rise of any trade or business likely to lead to an export 
trade. As the country has no commercial or agricultural resources, and as the 
people are so abjectly poor that it is impossible to increase taxation, it is difficult to 
see how the revenue is to be increased. On the contrary, the small local revenue 
now raised is likely to decrease a little if the Chinese Regiment is disbanded and 
other military forces are withdrawn."429  
Once more, such dismal speculations were repudiated under the supervision of 
Lockhart. The Commissioner doubled the land tax in 1902 without any disturbance 
aroused; wharfage dues and license fees maintained increase with the booming of the 
trade. During the years of 1902 to 1906, there was no significant economic 
prosperousness at Wei-Hai-Wei, but there was gradual and relatively steady growth. 
When the territory was handed over to the Colonial Office, it was expected to transfer 
the remote dependency into a self-supporting or even prospering commercial port. 
Considering Lockhart's rich administrative experiences and close contact with Hong 
Kong merchants, he was appointed as the first civil Commissioner at Wei-Hai-Wei. In 
the first four years, Lockhart managed to increase local revenue and reduce 
dependency on the grant-in-aid from London. In order to stimulate local economics, 
the Commissioner paid personal visits to Hong Kong and also maintained amicable 
relations with Shandong officials. He held full of enthusiasm and confidence to 
construct the territory when he assumed the office. However, the lack of support from 
home country and London's lackadaisical attitude towards the status of Wei-Hai-Wei 
since the Russo-Japanese War terminated the possibilities of development at the 
territory. Just as no road construction was carried on since 1906, little improvements in 
public works were made by the colonial government in the rest time of the leasehold. 
Annual reports sent to the Colonial Office became shorter and shorter as Wei-Hai-Wei 
found less and less to tell the outside world. 430 When Lockhart retired from 
Wei-Hai-Wei in 1921, one of his friends remarked, it was Lockhart's regret that "he 
has not been able to realise his cherished ambition of making Weihaiwei a 
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self-supporting colony."431 It seemed that Lockhart had done virtually all he could for 
this leased territory by the end of 1906. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
431 Wei Hai Archive, 229-1-126, Presentation to the Commissioner. 
87 
Chapter 5 Unachievable dream of a "second Hong Kong" 
Wei-Hai-Wei, although under abled Commissioner Lockhart, hardly achieved the 
dream to be "a Second Hong Kong" as predicted by some sanguine reporters and 
Lockhart himself. In 1907, the Colonial Office admitted that the failure to turn 
Wei-Hai-Wei into a second Hong Kong was not the fault of the Commissioner.432A 
tight-fisted Treasury, unwilling to spend expenditure at Wei-Hai-Wei, and the 
uncertain intention of London led Lockhart to do little but keep the territory on 
peaceful before he reach the age of retirement. But apart from the policy of London, 
the leased territory drifted downhill was determined by some joint factors. In this 
chapter, reasons that blocked the "dream" will be discussed.  
5.1 Geographic limits 
5.1.1 Far away from British traditional commercial sphere 
In the first place, located in the east tip of Shandong Peninsula, Wei-Hai-Wei's 
development under the British rule was confined by its geographical situation. During 
a state dinner in Berlin in May 1898, Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, 
remarked to the British Minister that the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei, in his opinion, "was 
a useless expense and indicated a departure from that practical common sense with 
which Englishmen were usually credited."433 He was not the only one with such 
judgement. When MacDonald and O'Conor exchanged the proposal to acquire 
Wei-Hai-Wei in order to counterpoise Russia, they argued, the territory was too far 
away from "our sphere of influence" in the Yangzi River region.434 Shanghai was 
opened as one of the five Treaty ports according the Nanjing Treaty in 1843. The 
Tianjin Treaty of 1858 not only opened new ports but also provided Great Britain the 
right to navigate and trade along the Yangzi River, which opened the Central China to 
British trade. By late 19th century, Yangzi valley became the area where British 
commercial presence and investments predominated. Nearly two thirds of the whole 
foreign trade of the world with China was conducted with the Yangzi basin and the 
provinces the river drains in the north.435 
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Almost at a glance at China map, one can see the large distance from Wei-Hai-Wei to 
Yangzi Valley. It is almost 800 miles away from Shanghai, even today it takes ten 
hours to travel from Wei-Hai-Wei to Shanghai by one of the fastest train in China. 
Although as the headquarters of the North Fleet before Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, 
there was no direct streamer to approach Wei-Hai-Wei except very few from Chefoo. 
The lease of Wei-Hai-Wei became a formal issue of Whitehall only after Russia 
occupied Port Arthur as a military fort in March 1898. By then, Britain ships had never 
visited the remote port of Shandong peninsular other than two frigate Alceste and Lyra 
happened to anchored in the harbor in the summer of 1816. When Hong Kong and 
Shanghai were turned into the most prosperous ports in Far East and several European 
communities were aroused in other Treaty ports, Wei-Hai-Wei was an unheard name to 
most Britain. The status of a leased territory had not improved its awareness in the 
home country. An English newspaper published in China has dubbed Wei-Hai-Wei the 
Cinderella of the British Empire.436 Prime Minister David Lloyd George (1916-22) did 
not even know where Wei-Hai-Wei was located until he looked up in an atlas, when he 
tried to discuss the restoration of the territory to China in 1920s.437 
The considerable distance away from Yangzi Valley, along with inconvenience of 
approaching, placed Wei-Hai-Wei at a disadvantage to be in connection with British 
business communities. A proposal attempting to make Wei-Hai-Wei a duty free 
godown because Shanghai was becoming more limited and more valuable, was 
abortive largely because the concern "what dealers will take delivery at so remote a 
point."438 In other words, Wei-Hai-Wei was too far from anywhere to be immediately 
promoted.439James Morris described Wei-Hai-Wei as "this most absolutely forgotten 
of imperial outposts."440 Despite as a British summer resort, Wei-Hai-Wei indeed 
attracted visitors and foreign fleets in Far East, the leased territory never become a 
household name to the average Englishman. 
5.1.2 Circumscribed by Qingdao and Chefoo 
From a commercial point of view, away from the British sphere of influence was not 
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the only drawback of Wei-Hai-Wei, the other shortcoming was that it was closely 
surrounded by two powerful opponents -Chefoo and Jiaozhou in Shandong peninsular. 
The Treaty port of Chefoo, on the north coast of Shandong and forty miles away from 
Wei-Hai-Wei by sea and sixty by land, had been opened to foreign trade since 1863. 
By late 19th century, Chefoo had become the chief center of trade in Shandong and the 
Gulf of Zhili. One observer remarked the booming trade at Chefoo vicinity as follows: 
"In this inn-yard of Laichow-fu (Lai zhoufu, just to the west of Chefoo) I 
counted forty-five animals at one time. There were carts, large and small, laden 
with goods of all kinds. Some were going west with bales of piece-goods, 
Manchester cottons, and woolen cloths. Some were en route for Chefoo with 
native produce, straw-braid for England and America, vermicelli for the south of 
China, great quantities of medicinal drugs, barks, roots, dye-stuffs, saffron 
thistle, and indigo, besides miscellaneous articles for home consumption."441 
By 1903, the value of goods traded, both imported and exported, in Chefoo took up 
two third of the whole amount of the province. 442  Impressed by the thriving 
commercial at Chefoo, Commissioner Lockhart thought "there seems no reason" why 
Wei-hai-wei, where no duties were levied, should not become a center for the trade of 
silk and beancake, both were chief exports of Shandong. 
Despite this, being the only important port by late 19th century in Shandong province, 
Chefoo was handicapped by a relatively shallow, unprotected harbor and was cut off 
from the rest of the province by a broad band of mountains.443 Thus, the open of the 
Jiaozhou Bay by German since 1898, and the completion of German railway from 
Jiaozhou to Jinan were certain to divert some of the trades once attracted to Chefoo. In 
sharp contrast to the British at Wei-Hai-Wei, the German were eager to develop their 
newly acquired territory on a large expenditure. Besides the sovereignty rights at 
Jiaozhou, German had acquired mining and railway concessions in Shandong 
province, and the right of supplying such foreign capital and plant as may be required 
for the development by the Treaty for the lease of Jiaozhou between China and 
German 1898. On a journey in Shandong in 1903, Captain Barnes, the 1st Chinese 
Regiment, believed that the Germans were well on the way to making Shandong a 
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German province, just as Russia did in Manchuria.444 Jiaozhou, regarded as a German 
colony in spite of the leased territory title, in the view of Germans, could rival Hong 
Kong. By 1914, German successfully transformed the once tiny fishing village of 
Qingdao, the capital of the German protectorate, into a modern city and first-class port. 
In fact, the trade in Chefoo had been decreasing while that of Jiaozhou was prospering 
since the latter was under the German rule. In order to compete with Jiaozhou's 
superior in railway, Shandong government tried to improve a canal which connected 
Chefoo and the hinterland in 1903. But the project was suspended in the following 
years.  
By 1906, Chefoo, which had been a treaty port for about 45 years, was gradually 
falling behind, whilst Jiaozhou was forgoing ahead. Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner 
noticed: 
"on the completion of the railway (Jiaozhou to Jinan) which taps the richest 
portion of the province, native goods which had always previously found their 
way from the interior to Chefoo were sent by rail for sail at Qingdao or for 
shipment to Shanghai: whilst foreign goods were conveyed into the province by 
the same route."445  
As regards to the prospect of trade at Wei-Hai-Wei, although it "possesses the finest 
harbor in the north of China"446, it shut in at the back by a rugged mountain rage, 
possessed no local industries of its own. The stream of trade, from the interior of the 
province to the coast, bifurcated at the point where the Shandong promontory 
commences, either trended northwards to Chefoo or southwards through easy and 
low-lying country to Jiaozhou.447 In his letter to home country, Lockhart complained 
the fact that with Jiaozhou on one side and Chefoo on the other and in the absence of 
railway, "it will be not an easy task to attract trade to this port."448 
5.2 A northern counterpart of Hong Kong from economical aspects 
Still, the status of a free port helped Wei-Hai-Wei attracted some trades. It brought 
commercial chances for the leased territory, but never transferred it into a booming 
port. One might wonder why free port worked for Hong Kong but not for 
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Wei-Hai-Wei. As a matter of fact, the comparison between Hong Kong and 
Wei-Hai-Wei cannot be set aside completely. Unlike Treaty ports, which were termed 
as informal imperialism, Wei-Hai-Wei and Hong Kong, including Kowloon and New 
Territories, were practically occupied by British Empire in China. Despite nominally a 
leased territory, Wei-Hai-Wei was regarded in every way as a colony. The two were 
compared a lot since Wei-Hai-Wei was leased. When Lockhart was appointed as the 
Commissioner, it was hoped that his experience in Hong Kong would help the newly 
acquired territory flourishing and at best to duplicate a second Hong Kong in north of 
China. 
There were some observers favored Wei-Hai-Wei a lot over Hong Kong at that time. 
Times predicated a bright future of Wei-Hai-Wei by stating Hong Kong was regarded 
for many years after its acquisition as an absolutely useless burden, and "in some 
respects by no means superior to that of Wei-hai-wei." The editor asserted 
Wei-Hai-Wei would fulfill for the commerce of Northern China just as Hong Kong 
had did for the commerce of Southern China as an important distributing center.449 
In his confidential report, giving serious consideration at the Colonial Office to 
convince Britain should retain at Wei-Hai-Wei, Lucas argued that "Hong Kong 
seemed to be more unpromising than Weihaiwei has seemed."450  
In the first place, Hong Kong then was far unhealthier than the other. Unlike 
Wei-Hai-Wei, the sanitary situation was much worse at Hong Kong. In 1894, the 
sudden outbreaks of bubonic plague in Canton and Hong Kong "had been causing 
havoc in southern China for some time."451 An official figure for the death of the 
plague in that year at Hong Kong was 2,552. A much larger number of deaths had been 
seriously underreported for those sent straight to burial in the town.452 In 1900, another 
plague had spread its deathly virus even to Hong Kong's peak. One of the Director's 
coolies had died in the summer house of the Governor, who provided accommodation 
to the Director of Public works.453 Lockhart himself was struck down by typhoid when 
he returned Hong Kong from a leave in Scotland. 
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Therefore, it is understandable for Lockhart to remark general health of Wei-Hai-Wei 
as "excellent", especially when there was an epidemic of measles at Chefoo, 60 miles 
away, and an epidemic of dengue and cholera at Shanghai in 1903, Wei-Hai-Wei did 
not suffer from any of those diseases though there had been two imported cases of 
dengue. There was no case of smallpox, enteric or malaria at Wei-Hai-Wei, except on 
two abovementioned imported case, which had been so much dreaded by Europeans in 
the Far East. 454  In the opinion of Dr. Hickin, who served as medical officer at 
Wei-Hai-Wei and had ever resided for many years in the Far East, the sanitary 
condition of Wei-Hai-Wei was better than that of "any other seaside place in 
China."455 
At the same time, similar commercial features existed at the two colonies. Hong Kong, 
as a free port, had never any revenue from Custom duties any more than Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Both of them hitherto had no any railway connection with inland. Lucas admitted that 
being on the direct line of trade, close to Guangdong and free from the competition of 
a contemporaneous German, the geographic of Hong Kong indeed owned some 
advantages against Wei-Hai-Wei. Yet, considering the pessimistic likeness records of 
Hong Kong in its early days, Lucas denied to lower expectation on the possibility of a 
future at Wei-Hai-Wei.456 
In 1844, Montgomery Martin, the Colonial Treasures remarked Hong Kong as 
followings: 
"Nearly four years' residence on or occupation of the island has failed to produce 
any commercial operation….There does not appear to be the slightest 
probability that, under any circumstances, Hong Kong will never become a 
place of trade. The island produces nothing whatever, its geographical position, 
either as regards the Chinese coast generally, or Canton in particular, is bad." 
Again, 
"It is indeed a delusion or a deception to talk of Hong Kong becoming a 
commercial emporium and to liken it to Singapore. The circumstances and 
position of Hong Kong and Singapore present no resemblance whatever. Hong 
Kong is a barren rock, producing nothing, not leading to any place, surrounded 
by no trading or populous communities with various commodities for barter, 
and disadvantageously situated at the most impoverished part of a coast line of 
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2,000 miles, and which, for half the year, is only readily accessible in one 
direction."457 
The description is almost word for word what was said by detractors of Wei-Hai-Wei 
of that place. It turned out that Hong Kong became one of the major distribution 
centers of China trade in the 1870s.458 However, such kind of miracle never happened 
at Wei-Hai-Wei though it was the only free port in the Gulf of Zhili before Japan 
opened Dalian duty free after Russo-Japanese war. 
For one thing, as Hare asserted if Wei-hai-wei were to begin to draw any of the trade of 
Chefoo away, the Chinese Government would surround the Settlement with customs 
barriers to check its growth.459Indeed, the good relations Lockhart maintained with the 
Shandong senior officials, assisted little in the development of Wei-Hai-Wei. With the 
arising of Qingdao, the trade at Chefoo already declined. The booming of 
Wei-Hai-Wei, in the vicinity of Chefoo, would be the last thing Shandong officials 
preferred. With nothing produced locally for export, Wei-Hai-Wei struggled to attract 
trade from the surrounding of Jiaozhou and Chefoo in a comparatively poverty 
northern province of China. 
Hong Kong used to be a barren rock like Wei-hai-wei, "but behind Hong Kong is the 
richest province in China," whose trade and people make Hong Kong their shipping 
port, and general trading mart for doing business with the rest of China.460 Hong Kong 
was then (and still is) of the great coaling station for those ply between east and west, 
and the third largest port in the world. To Hong Kong, free trade was, therefore, of 
great importance. 
Secondly, there was no exports or imports except very few for local European (which 
was limited) wanted in Wei-Hai-Wei. The main products traded here were ground nut 
and salt fish, both of which were to be influenced by the annual harvest and weather 
conditions. Therefore, it practically made no difference whether the port is a free one 
or whether the customs are collected.461 
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Hong Kong, although produced nothing either, can be regarded as a great trading 
emporium, as being "one of the greatest shipping terminal and ports of the word for all 
the great mail lines running east and west," as well as backed by the city of Canton, 
which was one of the richest and most prosperous cities in the East.462 
The last but not the least, free trade itself did not determine the prosperity of Hong 
Kong. That was the joint efforts of the wealth, brains, and enterprises of China and 
European, which were largely lack in Wei-Hai-Wei. Without promise of a certain 
tenure and practical assistance from the British government, no one would select a 
place to settle down in retirement and spend the fortunes especially at poverty, remote 
dependency. During the first three years, very few responded to any invitation to 
invest capital at Wei-Hai-Wei, although the Commissioner promised every assistance 
for the investors and enterprise.463 
Considering such differences, although there are some trades there, the free port 
should not be the sole or direct reliance to turn Wei-Hai-Wei into a second Hong 
Kong. 
5.3 Transportation limits 
As one of most important transportations for commerce, railway construction was 
forbidden at the colony since the first instance. When leased the territory, in order to 
pacify Germany, British made a pledge to German Government that Britain would not 
intend to challenge the latter's interests in Shandong by never making Wei-Hai-Wei a 
commercial port or never establishing connection within the peninsula by railway.464 
German had been evidently bent on monopolizing everything in Shandong. Thus 
German's ambition in Shandong was not going to let Wei-Hai-Wei flourish by means 
of rail at the cost of Jiaozhou.465 
One might bear in mind that Lockhart's proposal to build a railway linking Chefoo and 
Wei-Hai-Wei by foreign capitalists other than the British was rejected in 1902 after 
negotiation between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office. As a matter of fact, an 
earlier railway building plan made by G. T. Hare was soon abortive by the acting 
                                                          
462CO882/6/7, Letter No. 96, P93. 
463CO882/6/7, Letter No. 96. P94. 
464CO882/6/4, ’Correspondence Relating to the Administration of Wei Hai Wei’, Letter No. 1 and No. 2. 
465 Airlie, Thistle and Bamboo, P120. 
95 
commissioner himself. In his mind, to take advantage of Wei-Hai-Wei harbor, a 
railway connection to Tianjin would be beneficial to the latter as Tianjin port which 
was to be frozen in winter, as well to Wei-Hai-Wei. With the increasing trade in 
Tianjin and the good harbor in Wei-Hai-Wei, it should be necessary to have such 
railways to find an exit to the sea for Tianjin and also to enable merchants to expand 
their business in the northern China. However, he acknowledged that "although 
Wei-hai-wei has great natural advantages over Chefoo as a commercial port, it would 
not be reasonable to expect the Chinese Government to support a railway scheme that 
would otherwise deprive the provinces of Chili and Shantung of lucrative customs 
revenue."466 It appears that if there are no Germany's objections to such railway 
constructions, any transportation improvement to link the interior with Wei-Hai-Wei 
would be negated by Chinese government without strong support of the British 
government. Great Britain obviously had contracted itself out of the right to construct 
railways from Wei-Hai-Wei to the interior of the Shandong Province, through an 
assurance had been made to Germany. Although Lockhart applied several times, the 
authorities in the Whitehall did not show any intention to renegotiate the railway 
construction at the remote, isolated colony in China. 
Yet, Lucas of the Colonial Office maintained his prognosis that Wei-Hai-Wei could be 
transformed into a booming trade port even without a railway. He remarked "there is 
no reason for assuming that it must always remain in its present position… and the 
example of Hong Kong proves that a great port may develop in spite of the absence of 
railway communications…" 467 Given the abovementioned comparison between 
Wei-Hai-Wei and Hong Kong, Lucas' perspective turned out to be little more than a 
piousness. 
It should not merely to blame that the lack of railway in the territory confined goods 
currency at Wei-Hai-Wei, as a matter of fact, the original transportation itself was in a 
poor condition. Swettenham observed in 1900:"There are no cart roads or public 
works of any sort in the territory, but on the mainland there are mule tracks which 
answer the purpose of such a poor district." With respect to the external traffic, he went 
on his writings: "The old road from Weihaiwei to Chifu has fallen into great despair." 
Although Lockhart and his predecessors committed to improving the road system 
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within Wei-Hai-Wei, Chinese government likewise would not favor of expansion of 
the good roads out of the leased territory, "lest a really good road should draw any 
trade from the Chinese seaport to the British port of Weihaiwei."468 
One traveler noticed the huge difference on the road between Wei-Hai-Wei and its 
neighbors in 1906. When travelling across the leased territory, he praised some roads 
of Wei-Hai-Wei should be marked as mile-stones. Once over the boundary, he found 
himself on a hilly track where there was little traffic except a few mules and 
wheelbarrows.469 Additionally, visitors cannot approach Wei-Hai-Wei by sea except 
very few steamers plying between Chefoo before Lockhart changed the situation in his 
early years' office. 
The assurance made to Germany of no railway building and the absence of other 
traffic, to a certain extent, prejudiced the commercial interests at Wei-Hai-Wei. 
5.4 Uncertain tenure 
When it was linked the same duration as the occupation by Russia, Salisbury believed 
this would avoid the difficulties and inconvenience at Wei-Hai-Wei in regard to 
expenditure of money on improvements, if the Russian transfer their holding into 
perpetual possession.470 Such linkage did not induce great deal of policy support from 
the home country, as Russia did in Port Arthur, but caused strong uncertainty for 
Wei-Hai-Wei. Almost in the first instance of the possession, the rendition of 
Wei-Hai-Wei was put forward by its early colonial authority. 
Given the abandonment of military use and the little chance for commercial 
improvement, G. T. Hare, Acting Commissioner Assistant, who has been quoted 
above, argued that all the leased territories and the sphere of influence should be given 
up except the island and about three square miles of the mainland, i.e., except the 
actual harbor and enough land for a sanatorium. He opined "The rest of territory could 
be retransferred to the Chinese without making any difference to the position of 
Wei-hai Wei as a good sea harbor for the fleet and as a summer watering place for 
Europeans." In return for handing back this territory, China should be asked to cede 
                                                          
468CO882/6/4, Enclosure to Letter No. 52. ‘Report on Wei Hai Wei and its future administration. ’ P50. 
469 Atwell, British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers, P64-65. 
470FO 405/76, Salisbury to MacDonald, March 30, 1898. 
97 
Zhoushan, to be strongly fortified at the mouth of Yangzi River.471 Geographically 
speaking, Zhoushan would serve better to protect the commercial in Shanghai and 
strengthen British political position there. Moreover, the occupation of Zhoushan 
would put Great Britain in a strong position to exercise great political influence over 
provincial governors of the huge acres Yangzi River covered. While the acquisition of 
Wei-Hai-Wei, in the opinion of some cabinet ministers, there was no difference on the 
international situation in northern China and had little "direct effect" on Beijing court 
as a result of the limited squares and far distance.472Hare's proposal, in accordance 
with that of those "anti-Weihaiwei" party in 1898, though were not implemented, did 
encourage the climate of uncertainty over the duration of British occupation. 
Lockhart was full of optimism when he arrived at Wei-Hai-Wei in 1902, and he soon 
found that the uncertainty of Britain's intention with respect to the leased territory had 
done too much to arrest development.473 The uncertainty gained more significance in 
the following years. 
In 1905 when Russian was ousted from Port Arthur and Manchuria as a result of defeat 
in Russo-Japanese war, Wei-Hai-Wei was immediately under threat. Britain finally 
remained at the leasehold on the basis that Port Arthur was still being leased rather 
than in the hands of Chinese.  
Since the Russo-Japanese war, Japanese government had repeated their eagerness to 
have Britain stayed at Wei-Hai-Wei. As a matter of fact, even without the strong 
suggestions from Japanese, it appeared that the British were not willing to abandon 
their interests in north China to German, therefore would weaken British political 
position, 474  especially when the withdrawal of Wei-Hai-Wei would not induce 
compensating advantages to Britain. Some cabinet ministers pointed was curious that 
Britain's restoration of the colony would encourage Chinese to make further demands 
                                                          
471 CO 882/6/4, G.T. Hare, Confidential Report on the Civil Administration of Wei-Hai-Wei. March 31, 
1902. 
472 CAB 37/46, MacDonald to Salisbury, March 21, 1898. 
473CO521/4, Lockhart “Annual Report for 1902.”  
474 FO 881/8565, Memorandum Respecting Wei-hai Wei, January 2 1906. Annex No. 5. In the 
telegraph to Lansdowne, Satow wrote: ”Effect of our withdraw (from Wei-Hai-Wei) would be to 
furnish Germany with an opportunity of claiming it under Article 5 of her Kiao-chau Agreement, and 
would seriously weaken our political position.” 
98 
which could damage the current concessions British had acquired from the old 
country.475 
Although the British repeated their stand point to German that the occupation of 
Wei-Hai-Wei was to counterpoise Russia's action in northeast China when the 
leasehold was made in 1898, once noticed German's increasing influences and a 
serious of concessions in Shandong province, the British government realized the 
pressure from Germany in north China both commercially and politically. The treaty 
port of Chefoo, whose foreign trade was mostly developed by English and American 
merchants since 1860s, was facing the challenge of Jiaozhou. The dilemma to develop 
Wei-Hai-Wei, to a certain degree, was affected by German's restraint in mining and 
railway. As far as political influence is concerned, Lucas remarked that "if we give up 
Weihaiwei there will be no European power but Germany in evidence in North China", 
therefore, "to retire from Weihaiwei would be to give up North China to German 
domination, with endless prejudice to the future."476 
In the beginning of 1906, Foreign Office convinced that their presence at 
Wei-Hai-Wei must constitute a check upon the policy of absorption which Germany 
had been pursuing in Shandong since 1897 and serve as an encouragement to the 
Chinese authorities to resist that policy. On the other hand, British retirement of the 
colony must, "for a time at least, injure our (British) position and in the Far East 
generally."477 The principal to retain Wei-Hai-Wei seemed to be confirmed. Yet, as for 
a renew leasehold of the colony to ninety-nine years raised by Lucas and Satow 
respectively, it did not earned many response in the Whitehall finally.478 
In their petition to convince Foreign Office to remain the leased territory, China 
Association felt it necessary to cite the words of Lockhart's report on the value of 
Wei-Hai-Wei as a health resort for the British navy in Far Eastern Waters: 
"Perhaps no truer indication of the healthy nature of the place could be found 
than the benefit derived from a visit to Wei-hai Wei during the warmest and 
most trying (drying) part of the year by the crews of the ships of His Majesty's 
navy. Officers of that service have frequently told me that it requires but a short 
                                                          
475 FO 371/6645, Memorandum on Wei-hai Wei. P3. 
476 CO 882/6/17, Lucas, Wei-Hai-Wei Confidential Memorandum, 7 June 1904.  
477 FO 881/8565, Memorandum Respecting Wei-hai Wei, January 2 1906.  
478 FO 881/8565, Memorandum Respecting Wei-hai Wei, January 2 1906. Annex No. 7, Satow to 
Lansdowne, October 5, 1905.  CO882/6/17, Lucas, Wei-Hai-Wei Confidential Memorandum, June 7, 
1904. 
99 
stay in these waters to produce a most marked change for the better in the health 
of the ship's crews, and an analysis of the sick lists of the various ships during 
their stay here would result in giving to Wei-hai Wei a certificate for 
maintaining and producing good health which many places could not equal and 
few could surpass."479 
Aside from the benefit as a health station for British ships and for training crews in 
gunnery and military practice, the insignificant cost of civil administration contributed 
Britain's seizure of Wei-Hai-Wei. Along with the rise in revenue and decrease in 
grant-in-aid, no military or naval expenditure was asked for. The summary of 
Whitehall regarding the policy at Wei-Hai-Wei was "we do not ask for any 
fortifications or Imperial expenditure. We ask for a pronouncement that we are going 
to stay and will see to the rest."480 
The rest happened in the uncertain leased territory seemed not in accordance with 
Lockhart and those who may favor of the development of Wei-Hai-Wei. In Lockhart's 
second official visit to Jinan in 1906, there was a flurry of rumors reported that the 
Wei-Hai-Wei Commissioner was going to discuss the rendition of Wei-Hai-Wei with 
the Governor of Shandong.481 A number of newspapers and magazines were involved 
in the discussion on the restoration of Wei-Hai-Wei and some even argued about the 
financial compensation for Great Britain regarding its expenditure at Wei-Hai-Wei.482 
Such rumors and reports, though unfounded and rejected by colonial government, did 
adverse to Wei-Hai-Wei's prosperity. Merchants with a stake in the leased territory 
were cautious to expand their investments and some of them transferred their business 
to Chefoo and Qingdao.483 Although Wei-Hai-Wei colonial government attempted to 
assure them, the absence of a certain tenure and practical support from London led to 
continuous anxiety among capitalists upon the leased territory.  
A particular example was the fruit growing scheme at the colony. Wei-Hai-Wei was 
proved to be a favorable place for fruit growing by expert fruit grower both from 
London and Hong Kong.484 One expert believed that "the sales (of fruit) will cover 
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their original cost and that the sale of trees propagated from stock will also bring in 
something to the revenue."485 There seemed to be no prospect of anyone coming 
forward to invest the capital necessary for starting a fruit growing industry on a proper 
scale, though Lockhart had spared no pains in endeavoring to interest capitalists of 
Shanghai, Hong Kong and other places in fruit growing here. They all refused to invest 
any capital not only in fruit growing but also in any other enterprises in this territory in 
view of the uncertain nature of the tenure on which it was held. In his letter to the 
Colonial Office, Lockhart despairingly reported:  
"The timidity of capitalists also have been increased by the ceaseless rumors 
which have appeared in the press since the end of the Russo-Japanese war 
regarding the retrocession of Weihaiwei to China and by the reply that His 
Majesty's Government do not feel called upon to discuss hypothetical cases but 
that whatever contingency may arise, they could not entertain any claim of 
compensation to firms or individuals who have invested money in 
Weihaiwei."486 
Lockhart's continuous complaint did not earn any support to this isolated territory but 
made himself an antagonism name in Whitehall. In fact, by the end of 1906, the status 
of Wei-Hai-Wei should be described as nominally remained in the hands of British 
government, but virtually abandoned by the London government. 
Compared with other contemporary leased territories acquired by the western powers 
in the era of "scrambling for concessions", Wei-Hai-Wei was the single one without 
definite leasehold. Jiaozhou, Guangzhouwan and New Territories were leased to 
German, Great Britain and French respectively for ninety-nine years. Port Arthur and 
Dalianwan was stipulated to be leased for twenty-five years of tenure to Russia. The 
leasehold of Wei-Hai-Wei was dependent on that of Russia's remain in Port Arthur, 
thus set no terminal date for the end of British rule, since it was impossible to predict 
how long it would last. Technically speaking, Britain's continued retention of 
Wei-Hai-Wei after 1905 was a violation of the original Anglo-China convention for 
Wei-Hai-Wei. 
The comparable in population, square meters and terms of convention, as a counterpart 
of Wei-Hai-Wei in Southern China, New Territories experienced an opposite 
treatment from London, although both territories were leased at almost the same time 
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of 1898. At the time they were leased, each territory was an undeveloped rural 
backwater. The major difference was that New Territories was stipulated to be leased 
for ninety-nine years. From the onset, New Territories was regarded as a part of Hong 
Kong, thus the residents there were to be subjects of British Empire. In addition, being 
adjacent to Hong Kong, it gave New Territories every possible trading advantage 
whereas capitalists feared to invest money at Wei-Hai-Wei which could be returned to 
China in no time. New Territories, underwent exceeding flourishing as an integral part 
of colony of Hong Kong, along with Hong Island and Kowloon, were returned back to 
China in 1997, the expired date of the original convention of leasing. Yet, 
Wei-Hai-Wei had to languish in a state of uncertainty over its future since 1905. 
It was remarked in a confidential minutes in the order-in-council in 1907 that "Our 
policy [at Wei-Hai-Wei] therefore should be to restrict the activities of 
Government as much as possible to the Island and Port Edward; to interfere as 
little as possible with the villages of the interior which should be allowed to 
continue to run themselves through their village headmen, and to keep the 
expenditure as low as is consistent with decency."487 
The uncertain tenure and the virtual abandonment of London killed off the possibilities 
of any commercial chances for Wei-Hai-Wei.  
5.5 Shifts of international situation  
Among those reports regarding British withdraw in Wei-Hai-Wei in the year of 1906, 
one should notice one compelling discourse of the impending termination of the lease 
by analyzing the impact of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which was established in 1902 
and renewed in 1905. The editor opined the British authorities had come to the 
conclusion that "the Anglo-Japanese alliance obviates the necessity for a ‘suitable 
naval harbor in North China and the better protection of British commerce in the 
neighboring seas' which were the grounds upon which the lease was originally sought 
and obtained."488 Such analysis was supported by some ministers in the Cabinet who 
admitted the question [continue retention at Wei-Hai-Wei] was altered by the fact that 
Port Arthur was now "in the hands of a Power in alliance with Great Britain."489 Apart 
from some sporadic statements, there were very a few documents directly bespeak the 
connections, nevertheless, the shift of the international situation in Far East especially 
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in northern China along with the rise of Japan indeed affected the British policy at 
Wei-Hai-Wei in different occasions. 
As early as March 1898, when the Cabinet was still discussing the lease of 
Wei-Hai-Wei, Foreign Office expected Japan stay in Wei-Hai-Wei if Britain were not 
to lease the territory themselves.  
"If we are not to take Wei-hai Wei the next best thing would be that Japan should 
remain there, and to strengthen her purpose it would be necessary to promise to 
back her up in refusing to leave if called upon to do so by Russia, Germany, and 
France."490 
It was because of the Russo-Japanese war and the following victory of Japan aroused 
the continuous, prevailing climate of uncertainty of the leased territory. Had the war 
postponed one or two decades, Wei-Hai-Wei, under the superintendence of Lockhart 
and other facilities support, could have brought out some new commercial chances, 
just as it did from 1902 to 1905. 
Despite that several cabinet ministers in principal expressed the necessity to own a 
British flag in north China, the strong opinion of Japanese to ask Britain to remain at 
Wei-Hai-Wei cannot be ignored by the Whitehall. Continuous telegraphs reporting the 
goodwill of Japanese government to have British at Wei-Hai-Wei had been sending 
back to home country from British minister at Tokyo. In one telegraph, the 
representative of Japanese government even "begged" the British minister to manifest 
Japanese support to London regarding British retention at Wei-Hai-Wei.491 It, of 
course, seemed favorable to Japan that the naval port, although unfortified under 
British rule, should remain in possession of a strong and friendly Power, rather than a 
rivalry. 
Facing the overwhelming kindness of their Japanese allies, to give up the leased 
territory of Wei-Hai-Wei would be to offend Japan. Such diplomatic factors assisted 
British to continue to occupy Wei-Hai-Wei, but it did not help any certainty of the 
future at the leased territory. The fate leased territory from first instance influenced by 
the uncertain situation in north China. As it is hard to predict the shift of international 
relations in the Far East, the arrangement of Wei-Hai-Wei thus was largely hampered. 
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The issue of returning Wei-Hai-Wei to China was raised on two occasions during the 
First World War, in 1915 after Japan replaced Germany in Jiaozhou and expanded 
influence in Shandong province, and in the subsequent Paris Peace Conference.492 
Since 1915, the question of the continued occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei had aroused 
debate rages and again divided into opposite directions in the Whitehall, just as when 
the leased territory was to be taken over in 1898. The main points that favored of 
British retaining were that the abandonment would be a shattering blow to British 
prestige in the Far East.493 While those advocated the restoration to China regarded 
Wei-Hai-Wei were of no political and strategic value. Arthur Balfour, then the Lord 
President of the Council, claimed that it was useless to keep the leased territory since 
the "German and Russian menace" had passed away by 1915.494 
Owing to the trifling expenditure and slim hope of a flourished port, Balfour and his 
party ultimately prevailed, and the Cabinet finally agreed to return Wei-Hai-Wei to 
China. On 1 February 1922, Balfour, as the head of British delegation at Washington 
Conference, announced that Wei-Hai-Wei was to render back to China. As an 
American observer wrote in his diary that: "The gesture was graceful, but all of us 
knew that England did not want to keep it any longer and had no use for it."495 Yet, it 
still took eight years of protracted negotiations between British and Chinese 
authorities regarding the details of the rendition largely because the Chinese Regime 
alternated frequently during 1920s.496 
On 1 October 1930, the territory of Wei-Hai-Wei was formally handed back to China, 
while Liu-gong Island and its facilities were leased back for British navy. It was during 
World War II that Britain's stay at Wei-Hai-Wei finally came to an end. On 11 
November 1940, Japanese marines forced the last of the British garrison, four sailors, 
to evacuate, thus the curtain of the British Empire's 42-year administration was rung 
down in an ignominious way.497 
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5.6 Summary  
Away from the British commercial sphere of Yangzi Region, the isolated port at 
Wei-Hai-Wei cannot be by no means an economic radiation zone of Shanghai. 
Besieged by Chefoo and Qingdao from two directions, and with new challenges from 
Dalianwan to be a free port, the possibility to boom the trade at Wei-Hai-Wei was 
squeezed. Being a free port, although had worked for Hong Kong, was unable to 
transfer the poverty leased territory into a prosperous port in north of China. Like the 
railway and good road constructions to link the hinterland, any opportunities to 
facilitate commerce for Wei-Hai-Wei were suppressed by German and Chinese 
authorities. 
Given an undefined tenure of British rule, the inherent uncertainty of the leased 
territory led capitalists to invest there with scruple. Since Britain's occupation at 
Wei-Hai-Wei relied on Russia's seizure at Port Arthur, the status of Wei-Hai-Wei 
became illegal when Port Arthur was taken over by Japan since 1905. Although the 
London policy-makers came to the conclusion to continue keeping the leased territory, 
the core problem of Wei-Hai-Wei's uncertain tenure was not touched. Along with the 
change of the international situation in Far East, whether Wei-Hai-Wei should be 
maintained under British rule was affected by diplomatic factors from time to time. 
Yet, such factors had by no means ever benefited the development of the leased 
territory.  
If one retrospect the following table 3 to table 1, it is obvious that there was no 
significant increase both in revenue and expenditure at Wei-Hai-Wei from 1906. 
Although the deficit in the colony's finances kept growing and the British announced 
to stay in 1907, the subsidies from London continued to diminish except sporadic 
increase in very few years. The tendency of Wei-Hai-Wei's financial support from 
London apparently indicates the stingy policy adopted in the Whitehall. It should be 
understandable that the British government was unwilling to take any treasury burden 
since 1922 when a restoration was declared, and the total development of leased 
territory was actually bogged down as early as 1906. The wish to turn Wei-Hai-Wei 
into "a Second Hong Kong" after a couple of years became an unachievable dream. 
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Table 3 Government Revenue and Expenditure, 1911-31498 
Year Revenue ($) Expenditure ($) Grant-in-aid(￡) 
1911-12 75,673 153,690 6,000 
1912-13 76,582 146,143 6,000 
1913-14 93,780 166,959 8,000 
1914-15 199,898 148,185 5,000 
1915-16 115,662 156,697 3,000 
1916-17 126,908 139,299 Nil 
1917-18 128,990 150,234 650 
1918-19 134,543 162,292 4,000 
1919-20 161,726 106,431 7,000 
1920-21 164,973 235,445 20,000 
1921-22 
 
212,464 270,306 8,000 
1922-23 195,946 203,741 Nil 
1923-24 213,956 205,411 Nil 
1924-25 
 
1924-25 
204,353 181,798 Nil 
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1925-26 224,217 190,147 Nil 
1926-27 240,763 214,331 Nil 
1927-28 256,494 247,014 Nil 
1928-29 324,636 313,145 Nil 
1929-30 463,365 343,145 Nil 
1930-31 590,367 396,819 Nil 
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Conclusion 
The main theme of this thesis is to investigate why Wei-Hai-Wei became an ignored 
colony under the British rule. Nonchalant with its naval significances and commercial 
potentials, the British government was reluctant to prompt the leasehold in northern 
China. The total leasehold lasted 32 years, yet the fate of this territory was determined 
in its first decade, concretely from 1898 to 1906. 
Facing the fierce competition of "scramble for concessions" in China with other 
powers, the British had to revise their policy of maintaining China's integrity so as to 
preserve British privileges and commercial interests in this old country. Wei-Hai-Wei 
and New Territories were both leased under such historical context. The whole course 
of leasing Wei-Hai-Wei was full of debates and hesitations in the Whitehall. Although 
some cabinet ministers discussed the possibilities of acquiring some place in China 
after German's action in Jiaozhou, it was not until March 1898, when Russia intended 
to make Port Arthur into a military port, that the British government began to raise the 
request of leasing Wei-Hai-Wei to Zongli Yamen.  
There was a strong disagreement in the Whitehall about the leasing of Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Yet, with the expansion of Russia's influence in northern China and the Beijing court, 
Wei-Hai-Wei’s military position made it as a counterpoise to Russia in Bohai bay. The 
urgent acquisition of Wei-Hai-Wei, to some extent, was to avoid a war with Russia, as 
belligerents roared up. Although the nature of ''a naval harbor'' was stipulated in 
Convention for the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, the port was occupied mainly due to the 
British political considerations rather than its naval significance. Few commercial 
considerations were taken into account during the decision-making of leasing 
Wei-Hai-Wei. Otherwise, Britain's pledge to the German not to develop 
Wei-Hai-Wei's commerce would have not been made as soon as a verbal leasing 
approval was attained from the Qing government.  
Once in possession, the administration system at Wei-Hai-Wei became a 
time-consuming subject between the Colonial Office, the War Office, and the 
Admiralty. Although the military and naval significance had not been fully consulted 
in the leasing, it was presumed to enhance the British navy force in China. Over 
three-year's protraction, the Admiralty and the War Office decided to abandon 
Wei-Hai-Wei as a military port. In the instance of 1902, the properties and authorities 
108 
were handed over to the Colonial Office. Therefore, the civil administration was to be 
established at Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Twenty years of administrative experience in Hong Kong and proficiency in Chinese 
languages and cultures, as well as his success in New Territories and close connection 
with Hong Kong merchants (mostly Chinese), convinced the Colonial Office that 
Stewart Lockhart would be the best one to serve as the first Civil Commissioner at 
Wei-Hai-Wei. 
Given his enthusiasm and skilled management, Lockhart indeed brought some revenue 
increase and trade to Wei-Hai-Wei since he assumed office. In order to induce 
commercial chances, Lockhart spared no pains to improve the transportation, both 
roads and steamers, the mail system and other facilities. He took every advantage of 
personal relations in Hong Kong trying to persuade capitalists there to invest in 
Wei-Hai-Wei. Without official support from London and a certain tenure, very few 
merchants responded to Lockhart's invitation. His good relationship with Shandong 
authorities did not assist the commercial development at Wei-Hai-Wei, but helped the 
commissioner gain personal friendship with those Chinese officials. By 1907 Lockhart 
found himself an unwelcome name in the Colonial Office, partly because his 
supervisors were annoyed by his continuous complain on the uncertainty of the leased 
territory, partly because his longtime supporter Lucas did not stay in the Colonial 
Office. The situation of Lockhart in the Colonial Office, of course, could not help the 
commissioner to apply for financial funding. After Russia was ousted from Port 
Arthur, the British government, however, did not intend to renew the leasehold or 
confirm a tenure of Wei-Hai-Wei. As the policy adopted by London on Wei-Hai-Wei 
became more tightfisted, Lockhart had to give up the hope to transfer Wei-Hai-Wei 
into a booming commercial port. 
Although some reports indicated a hope to transfer Wei-Hai-Wei to a ''second Hong 
Kong," its inherent drawbacks combined with some external limitations had prevented 
the chances of developing the leased territory. Away from Yangzi Region, 
Wei-Hai-Wei was out of the British traditional sphere of influence. The contemporary 
prosperousness of Yangzi Region by no means brought economic radiation to the 
isolated, distant leased territory in the Shandong peninsular. Circumscribed by 
Qingdao in the south and Chefoo in the north, Wei-Hai-Wei was deprived of any 
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commercial possibilities either by Germany or by China. Ironically, the original 
consideration to lease Wei-Hai-Wei was largely because of its location which was 
close to Beijing and Port Arthur. Being a ''free port'' itself cannot make Wei-Hai-Wei a 
trade center, while the free port of Hong Kong had been flourishing under the British 
rule as a result of many other advantages which Wei-Hai-Wei lacked. The absence of 
convenient transportation like the railway and good roads, as well as the poor 
conditions in the leased territory were against the commercial opportunities. More 
importantly, the uncertain tenure from the beginning put Wei-Hai-Wei into adversity 
to attract investments to the leased territory. The prevailing uncertainty since the 
Russo-Japanese War hampered Wei-Hai-Wei's development further. By the beginning 
of 1907, although Britain remained in Wei-Hai-Wei, the Whitehall adopted a stingy 
financial policy in Wei-Hai-Wei because it was going to be returned to China sooner 
or later. The lack of willingness to construct and reserve Wei-Hai-Wei, Britain's 
intention in the colony was largely affected by the international situation since Russia 
left Port Arthur. Breaching the original Convention for the lease of Wei-Hai-Wei, the 
illegal status of the leased territory raised discussion of return from time to time. There 
was little commercial increase in Wei-Hai-Wei during the remaining leasehold, and 
the leased territory continued languished.  
In 1898, the debates and hesitation in the decision-making process among those 
cabinet ministers indicated that the occupation of Wei-Hai-Wei by no means a 
steadfast choice for Britain. The linkage with Russia's intention at Port Arthur 
manifested Wei-Hai-Wei's political significance of the British in China. Yet, its 
military and naval value at the end was overlooked by the War Office and the 
Admiralty after three years of protracted inter-department discussion. By 1902, 
Wei-Hai-Wei was handed over to the Colonial Office officially. It was expected to be 
a commercial flourishing, at least self-supporting port under the civil administration. 
Although an experienced and abled commissioner was appointed to the leased 
territory, little support was offered from London to improve local economy in the 
whole leasehold. I argue that British did not have a resolute intention in Wei-Hai-Wei 
since its occupation in 1898. Wei-Hai-Wei’s failure to become a naval base in the first 
few years and the frequent transfer of the port among departments and its continuous 
fading after 1906 suggest that its marginalization in the British Empire was a 
continuous process rather than a single event. 
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